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The last two terms of the Supreme Court have witnessed important
developments in the Court's approach to Congress' power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment (the so-called "Section 5" power).' Prior to the
2002-2003 term, the Court had never upheld a Section 5-based statute using
the "congruence and proportionality" standard it enunciated in the 1997 case
of City of Boerne v. Flores.2 Instead, in a string of post-Boerne cases, the
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I. Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is found in Section 5. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
2. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
Court applied that standard to find that Congress had exceeded its power to
enact "appropriate" legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of due process and equal protection.3
Those post-Boerne cases reflected the Court's continuing suspicion of
congressional power and, conversely, its solicitude for state sovereignty.4 In
particular, they revealed the Court's skepticism that serious constitutional
violations were afoot that justified remedial legislation, and that Congress
had enacted legislation that was a proportionate remedy for the violations
that did exist. The Court's approach to the first of these issues reflected its
insistence on primacy in defining constitutional rights; in turn, the second
issue revealed unwillingness to defer to Congress' own decisions how to
wield its remedial power. A statement in one of these cases, Kimel v. Board
of Regents, encapsulates the Court's approach: after determining that the
challenged statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, sought to
safeguard the equal protection rights of a non-suspect class using remedies
that struck the Court as unnecessarily harsh, the Court concluded that the
statute "was an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential
problem."
5
Still, the post-Boerne cases left unanswered important questions about
the Court's new Section 5 jurisprudence. Most importantly, none of them
had considered the legitimate scope of legislation benefiting a suspect class.6
Additionally, with the exception of Boerne itself, which considered a statute
that was in many ways sui generis,7 none of these cases considered
3. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (equal protection rights of the
disabled); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (equal protection rights of the elderly);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (property
rights). In another post-Boerne case, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court
struck down, as inappropriate Section 5 legislation, the federal Violence Against Women Act, on the
ground that it regulated the conduct of private parties rather than the state. Because Morrison based
its result solely on the proposition that Section 5 did not authorize Congress to regulate private
conduct, it will not be considered in detail since Title H clearly applies to state actors. Id.
4. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (announcing a new doctrine that
Congress may not commandeer state governmental processes); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996) (holding that Congress' Article I power does not extend to abrogating state sovereign
immunity for retrospective relief in federal court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending
the Seminole Tribe rule to suits against states in state court); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 526 U.S.
261 (1997) (barring relief under Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment when the
requested relief trenches on state's sovereign interests).
5. 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000).
6. See William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay State Employees Under the Proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, 22 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 5 n.27 (2002) (noting the unanswered Section 5
questions after Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett) (hereinafter "ENDA"]; see also supra
note 3 (discussing the relevance of Morrison).
7. Concededly, Boerne considered legislation designed to protect religious freedom - surely a
fundamental right. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511. However, the statute struck down in that case was so
obviously aimed at overturning Supreme Court precedent, thus not "enforcing" the Fourteenth
Amendment but instead interpreting it, that the Court had little difficulty finding Congress had
exceeded its Section 5 authority. Id. at 536. There was no dissent in Boerne on the question of the
application of "congruence and proportionality" standard to the statute. The only dissents, by
Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, dealt with the substance of the underlying constitutional rule
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legislation protecting a fundamental constitutional value. Thus, even after
these cases were decided, the question remained how the Court would
respond to legislation that sought to enforce equality and substantive rights
the Court itself had determined to be of special moment.
The Court began to answer that question in 2003. That year, in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,8 the Court upheld the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 as appropriate Section 5 legislation to
enforce the equal protection rights of women. The FMLA required
employers, including states, to provide employees with leave time to care for
sick family members or new children.9 The Court upheld application of the
FMLA to the states on the theory that inappropriate gender stereotypes cast
women as the primary family caregivers, thus as less reliable employees, and
the FMLA combated such stereotypes by giving men and women equal
rights to take on that traditionally gendered role.'
A year after Hibbs, in Tennessee v. Lane," the Court upheld Title II of
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) against a Section 5 challenge.
Title H of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the
provision of "the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.' 12 The
Court upheld application of Title II to the states as applied to disability
discrimination in the provision of access to courts, based on the importance
of the right to access courts and evidence of state discrimination in that
regard.' 3 Thus, Hibbs and Lane upheld statutes that attempted to safeguard,
respectively, the equality rights of a quasi-suspect class, 14 and rights that the
Court considered "basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which
are subject to more searching judicial review."' 5
For all its importance as the case that broke the states' Section 5
winning streak, Hibbs can be seen in retrospect as a relatively easy case.
The FMLA is a narrow statute, in the sense that it confined itself to the use
that was the subject of the legislation. See id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
underlying substantive rule); id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing doubts about the
underlying rule); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing doubts about the underlying rule).
8. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2612 (1998).
10. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 936-37.
11. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2004). By contrast, in Garrett, the Court struck down Title I of the
ADA, which prohibited much employment discrimination based on disability. Bd. of Trs. of Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
13. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994. The Court expressed no opinion on other applications of Title 11.
For a discussion of this as-applied approach to statutes challenged on Section 5 grounds, see infra
Part II (A).
14. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing gender as a quasi-suspect class); see
also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546 (1996) (requiring that gender classifications be
supported by "an exceedingly persuasive justification").
15. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
of a single classification tool (gender) in a discrete regulatory field
(employment leave for family reasons). Moreover, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion relied heavily on the fact that the FMLA's
Section 5 justification rested squarely on the fact that the statute targeted
gender discrimination, a classification that receives judicial heightened
scrutiny. According to the Court, the extra scrutiny courts gave such
classifications made "it... easier for Congress to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations."1 6 Given this lower threshold, the Court found the
FMLA constitutional through what at least in theory was a relatively
straightforward application of the doctrine from cases such as Boerne and
Kimel, despite the somewhat unusual gender equality theory on which it was
based 7 and the admittedly more generous interpretation of the congressional
evidence of the need for Section 5 legislation. 8
Lane, however, raised more difficult questions for the Court. While
Title II of the ADA applied to rights the Court has considered especially
important, such as the right of access to the courts, it also applied to every
service or program offered by a state.' 9 Thus, Title II cut across far more
regulatory areas than the FMLA (and indeed, any of the statutes the Court
had considered since Boerne). As a consequence, Title II could have been
feasibly justified as general protection for the equal protection rights of the
disabled.a So understood, Title II was broader both in its regulatory reach
and its potential constitutional basis; its breadth required the Lane Court to
determine both how to frame the issue before it and, once it framed that
issue as one of judicial access, how to determine the relevance of disability
discrimination in areas other than judicial access. The Court's approach to
these questions is important to the Section 5 doctrine generally due to the
very nature of the congruence and proportionality test. Because that test is -
literally - a proportionality test that requires some ends-means fit, how
broadly or how narrowly the Court conceptualizes the proper unit of analysis
will matter in every Section 5 case.2'
Beyond answering these important questions, the Court in Lane also
suggested several other potentially significant changes in its approach to
Section 5 issues. First, the majority credited evidence of discrimination
submitted to a congressionally-created task force, not evidence submitted
directly to Congress, let alone evidence transmuted into formal
congressional findings.22 Second, in dicta relegated to a footnote, the
16. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
17. Id. at 737-39.
18. See id. at 730-34.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2004).
20. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988 ("Title II ... seeks to enforce [the Fourteenth Amendment's]
prohibition on irrational disability discrimination.").
21. See discussion infra Part 11 (A) (discussing the Court's use of evidence dealing with matters
other than disability discrimination with regard to courthouse access); discussion infra Part II (A)
(discussing the Court's use of an as-applied analysis in upholding the statute).
22. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 (citing Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of
Americans With Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990)).
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majority suggested that evidence of private party conduct was relevant when
considering the need for legislation aimed at state actors. Third, it stated,
rather casually although with a potentially important caveat, that Congress
had the power to ban discriminatory effects in order to deter or remedy
24actions that had a discriminatory motive.
Finally, Justice Scalia, writing separately from the other three dissenters,
made an important statement that will surely bear on future Section 5 cases.
Justice Scalia rejected Boerne's congruence and proportionality standard as
too malleable and subjective. 2' He then announced that, with the important
exception of statutes dealing with racial discrimination, he would henceforth
vote to confine congressional power under Section 5 to statutes that
essentially provided causes of action for violations of the judicially-
announced constitutional rule, or that would otherwise directly facilitate
judicial enforcement.2 6  With regard to legislation remedying race
discrimination, however, Justice Scalia went in the other direction,27
announcing his intention to apply a modified version of the deferential test
espoused in Katzenbach v. Morgan.28
This Article considers these important moves by the Court and
individual justices in Lane. After introducing the case, it begins its analysis
in Part I with an examination of how the Court characterized the
constitutional violation Congress sought to remedy in Title II of the ADA.
Part II then considers how the Court construed the evidence of such
constitutional violations. Part III considers the problem posed by the
breadth of the statute in relation to the constitutional violations the Court
focused on. These first three parts reflect the standard Section 5 analysis the
Court has engaged in under Boerne: determining the scope of the
constitutional violation targeted by the legislation, considering any evidence
suggesting that the problem was worse than what was indicated by the
Court's own jurisprudence, and then comparing the result to the statute to
determine whether the latter is "congruent and proportional.,, 29 These first
three Parts examine whether Lane suggests a different Court approach to
these issues. Part IV considers the Court's and Justice Scalia's approaches
in light of their potential effect on other likely future Section 5 issues. The
23. Id. at 1991 n.16.
24. See id. at 1986 ("When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination,
§ 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in
effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.").
25. See id. at 2007-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 2007-13.
27. Id. at 20l1-12.
28. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (first step); id. at
368 (second step); id. at 372-73 (third step).
Article concludes in Part V by evaluating Lane's place in the Court's
unsteadily evolving Section 5 jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION: THE LANE CASE
Lane involved claims of disabled individuals that were unable to attend
judicial proceedings. 30  George Lane, a paraplegic, attempted to access a
second-floor courtroom in the Polk County, Tennessee, courthouse in order
to answer criminal charges.3 ' Because the courthouse did not have an
elevator, Lane had to leave his wheelchair and crawl up a stairway to attend
court sessions.32 He refused to do this again when required to attend later
proceedings, and also refused an offer by deputies to carry him up the
stairs.33 At least one session in his case was held in a ground floor library
that Lane alleged was not generally accessible to the public.34 Beverly
Jones, the second plaintiff, is also a paraplegic.35  She requested
modifications to Tennessee courthouses to allow her to conduct business as a
court reporter.36 Both plaintiffs sued Tennessee and a number of counties
under Title II, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.37
The district court refused to dismiss the case on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that refusal.38 The Sixth Circuit
based its decision on that court's en banc holding in Popovich v. Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas,39 that Title II validly abrogated state
sovereign immunity to the extent it protected due process rights. Popovich
also held, though, that Title II's abrogation was invalid to the extent that it
implicated equal protection rights. The appellate court in Lane remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether in fact the plaintiffs had
suffered violations of their due process rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit.40 It stated first that, as
presented in that case, Title II could be viewed as protecting the due process
right to judicial access or the more general equal protection rights of the
disabled.41 The Court proceeded, without explicitly announcing it, to
consider Title II only as it applied to the former.42 It then presented the
30. The facts and procedural history are taken from the Court's opinions as well as the briefs in
the case. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1983.
33. Id.
34. Petitioner's Reply Br. at 3, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-1667).
35. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
36. Br. for the Private Resp'ts at 6, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-1667).
37. Id. at 6-7.
38. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1983.
39. 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 812 (2002).
40. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
41. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
42. Id.
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evidence it considered relevant to that application of Title 11.43  That
evidence consisted of state discrimination against the disabled across a
variety of subjects, including, but not limited to, the provision of judicial
services."4 Following the Court's settled Section 5 doctrine, the Court then
considered whether Title II's provisions were congruent and proportional to
the constitutional right it sought to vindicate.4 5 In considering Title II's fit
with that underlying right, the Court explicitly stated that it was limiting its
holding to Title II's vindication of that right, rather than to Title II overall.46
It decided that, as applied to judicial access, Title II satisfied the congruence
and proportionality test, since its requirement of reasonable accommodation
tracked the Court's own constitutional rule that cost and convenience
considerations did not warrant states in denying access to judicial
processes.47
I. DELINEATION OF THE RIGHT
Lane required the Court to decide the grounds on which to evaluate Title
II's Section 5 basis. At its most basic, the case offered the Court the option
of considering Title II as an enforcement of the equal protection rights of the
disabled, or, alternatively, as an enforcement of a variety of due process
rights the deprivation of which, in the Court's words, were "subject to more
searching judicial review. '48 As examples of such rights the Court cited
Dunn v. Blumstein,49 which protected the right to vote, Shapiro v.
Thompson,"' which has come to be understood as protecting an incompletely
defined "right to travel," and Skinner v. Oklahoma,5 which protected rights
to procreation. 2 The Court chose the due process basis, and in particular,
based on the facts of the case before it, the due process right of access to
judicial proceedings.5 3
As a tactical matter this choice makes eminent sense. The due process
rights the Court cited Title II as protecting are considered "basic,"
43. See id. at 1989-92.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1992-94.
46. See id. at 1993.
47. See id. at 1993-94.
48. Id. at 1988.
49. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down one-year state and three-month county residence
requirements for voter registration).
50. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down residency requirements for qualification for welfare
assistance).
51. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down law mandating sterilization after commission of multiple
crimes of certain types).
52. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
53. Id.
"infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review., 54
By contrast, state action burdening the disabled as a class receives only
rational basis scrutiny, even if the Court has previously found one disability-
related classification to fail rational basis review.55 Thus, in choosing the
grounds on which to consider the statute, the Court in Lane followed the
logic driving Hibbs the year before - that Congress will have an easier time
justifying a Section 5 statute when it is aimed at a right enjoying more
judicial protection under Section 1.56 That choice also meant that the Court
could avoid a more direct collision with Garrett and Kimel, both of which
had established stringent requirements for Section 5 legislation enforcing
rights the Court itself had protected only through the rational basis test.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent impliedly acquiesced in that choice,58 even
though a later part of his critique targeted the entire idea of testing Title II as
applied to a particular right.
59
The Court's approach to this preliminary issue suggests the caution with
which Justice Stevens wrote the opinion. Unquestionably, this caution was
driven by the need to retain the vote of Justice O'Connor, who had joined
the majority opinions in Garrett,6° Florida Prepaid 61 and Morrison,62 and
who authored the opinion in Kimel.63 At the same time, the latitude Justice
54. Id. It bears repeating that Title II also protects other, less weighty, rights. At this stage of its
opinion the Court simply ignored those other rights.
55. See City ofClebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
56. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982; see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992 (emphasizing the rationale in
Hibbs that "because the FMLA was targeted at sex-based classifications, which are subject to a
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, 'it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations' than in Garrett or Kimel, both of which concerned legislation that targeted
classifications subject to rational-basis review").
57. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) ("The legislative record
of the ADA... simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination in employment against the disabled."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86
(2000) ("The [ADEA] ... prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices
than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard.").
58. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1998.
In this case the task of identifying the scope of the relevant constitutional protection is
more difficult [than in Garrett, Hibbs, Kimel and City of Boerne] because Title n
purports to enforce a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled persons: not only the
equal protection right against irrational discrimination, but also certain rights protected by
the Due Process Clause. However, because the Court ultimately upholds Title II as it
applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, the
proper inquiry focuses on the scope of those due process rights.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
59. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for upholding
Title II as applied to courthouse access, rather than considering Title II in its entirety); see also
discussion infra Part III (A).
60. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358.
61. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 629 (1999).
62. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000).
63. Kimel v. Fla. Bd..of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 65 (2000).
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Stevens enjoyed to base the opinion on the right to judicial access meant that
he was explicitly able to leave undecided the equal protection ground.
64
The Court's choice raises issues about the proper approach to the
Section 5 power. First, as noted above, Chief Justice Rehnquist protested
the very idea of limiting Section 5 review to a particular application of a
given statute.65 Second, the Court's approach raises issues of evidentiary
relevance. In particular, while the Court confined its holding to Title II's
application to courthouse discrimination, it cited evidence of disability-based
discrimination in areas such as marriage and voting as proof of the problem
Title II sought to combat. The next part of this Article discusses this
interplay between the scope of the Court's review and the relevance of
particular pieces of evidence supporting the need for the statute.66
II. THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD
After identifying the right at issue as primarily a due process right to
judicial access, the Court then proceeded to consider the evidence of
discrimination. The Court did not mince its words; its analysis of the
evidentiary record began as follows: "It is not difficult to perceive the harm
that Title II is designed to address. Congress enacted Title II against a
backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state
services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental
rights., 67 This Part of the Article begins by examining the Court's treatment
of disability-based discrimination by states. It then considers the Court's
approach to evidence of discrimination by non-state entities. It concludes by
evaluating Lane's approach to the evidence, and what that approach means
for the Court's evolving understanding of Section 5.
A. Evidence of State Discrimination
The Court began its evidentiary inquiry by citing legal burdens on
disabled persons' ability to participate in government-run programs and
services.68 It cited a variety of legal sources: state statutes that simply
treated disabled persons differently with regard to services such as marriage
and voting, Supreme Court decisions finding unconstitutional disability
discrimination (all of the cases which dealt with mental disabilities), and
cases where lower courts had found discrimination based on a variety of
64. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994 n.20.
65. See discussion infra Part III (A).
66. See discussion infra Part II.
67. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989.
68. Id.
disabilities and a variety of contexts, including prisons, schools, and
voting.69
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent took issue with this part of the
majority's evidentiary presentation. He argued that the cited evidence was
irrelevant to Title II, since much of it dealt with the provision of services
other than judicial access, 70 and reflected discrimination that was
nevertheless constitutionally permissible.7 '
After concluding that the above evidence indicated persistent disability-
based discrimination despite state and preexisting federal anti-discrimination
legislation,72 the Court then narrowed its evidentiary focus to judicial
.proceedings and courthouses. 73 The Court cited evidence from a 1983 report
from the U.S. Civil Rights Commission that concluded: "76% of public
services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to
and unusable by persons with disabilities ... . They also cited direct
testimony to Congress about the physical inaccessibility of courthouses,75 as
well as examples of disability-based courthouse exclusion uncovered by a
congressionally-charged task force.76
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent also criticized this part of the
majority's evidence. He characterized the Civil Rights Commission's 76%
figure as "a single conclusory sentence" that might not have even included
courthouses.7 7 He attacked the reference to direct congressional testimony
as merely comprising the statements of two witnesses, "neither of whom
reported being denied the right to be present at constitutionally protected
court proceedings., 78  Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the
congressional task force's evidence as anecdotal and unclear with regard to
whether the evidence showed actual exclusion.79
At stake in this dispute is the future of Garrett's critical inquiry into the
evidentiary support for Section 5 legislation. In Garrett, the Court engaged
in an extremely close review of the evidentiary support for Title I of the
ADA, which restricted disability-based employment discrimination.8 ° That
inquiry led the Garrett Court to express concern over what it saw as the
relatively small number of discrimination incidents identified by Congress
69. Id. at 1989-1990.
70. Id. at 1999 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2000 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1990.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1991.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1997, 2001 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id.; see also id. at 2001 n.7.
79. Id. at 2001 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing this evidence as "a few anecdotal
handwritten reports of physically inaccessible courthouses, again with no mention of whether States
provided alternate means of access").
80. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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itself that did not necessarily reflect unconstitutional discrimination, 8' given
the rational-basis standard applicable to disability discrimination.8 2 Further
cause for concern was the fact that most of these incidents did not pertain to
employment, which was the subject of Title 1,83 and no precise factual
findings by Congress relating to the existence of unconstitutional state-
sponsored employment discrimination based on disability were presented.
84
Lane's favorable evaluation of the evidence revealed a significantly
more lenient evidentiary standard than Garrett. First, Lane's overall
appraisal of the evidence suggests a stronger presumption in favor of
Congress than does Garrett and cases before it. This difference is a matter
not of formal doctrine, but rather of the Court's general predisposition, what
Justice Frankfurter in an analogous context referred to as a "mood.,
85
Justice Frankfurter was referring to the standard of judicial review of
administrative action that Congress had mandated in the Administrative
Procedure Act.86  While that topic is seemingly far from issues of
congressional power under Section 5, it is nevertheless analogous because,
like the Lane Court's review of the evidence, it must be examined not just
for what the Court says it is doing but for what the Court actually does.
Standards of review - whether of agency action or congressional work-
product - are accorded true meaning not when they are explicated, but when
they are applied.
Thus, while Lane's actual review of the evidence is not marked by any
self-conscious alteration of pre-existing law,87 that review surely reveals a
more lenient mood than does the analogous review in Garrett and previous
cases. For example, compare Lane's approving citation of a report's finding
that "76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings
were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities" '88 and of a
task force's evidence of "numerous examples" of "exclusion" of disabled
81. See id. at 368.
82. See id. at 368-69.
83. See id. at 369.
84. See id. That critical inquiry also included skepticism about the fact that many of the
examples of state-sponsored discrimination derived not from congressional investigation but from
the report of a congressionally-assigned task force, which itself made no findings about
discrimination. See id. at 379. This aspect of Garrett's fact finding inquiry was also at issue in
Lane, and is discussed below. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. Finally, Garrett took
issue with the fact that many examples of disability discrimination were from the private sector.
This aspect too arose in Lane. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
85. See Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd,, 340 U.S. 474,487 (1951).
86. Id. at 474.
87. By contrast, the Court's determination of what evidence is actually relevant is changed in
Lane. See infra notes 88-126 and accompanying text.
88. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1990.
people from judicial services with Garrett's dismissal of similarly general
examples of disability-based employment discrimination by states:
Several of these incidents undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness
on the part of state officials to make the sort of accommodations for
the disabled required by the ADA. Whether they were
[unconstitutionally] irrational under our decision in Cleburne is
more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out of
context. But even if it were to be determined that each incident
upon fuller examination showed unconstitutional action on the part
of the State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even
suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §
5 legislation must be based.89
This difference between Lane and previous cases cannot be reduced to a
formula, or to a change in formal doctrine. It is, instead, a change in the
Court's "mood." But it is no less important, both for its implications for
future Supreme Court cases and the implicit message it sends to lower
courts.
Lane's evidentiary review also reveals more explicit changes in the
Court's review of evidence supporting a Section 5 statute, which
complement its more generous review mood. First, Lane did not confine its
review to examples of clearly unconstitutional state conduct, as had Garrett
and cases before it.90 Lane described state conduct in this area as marked by
"pervasive unequal treatment," "prohibiti[ons on] persons engaging in
activities such as marriage and serving on juries," "a pattern of unequal
treatment," 9' and a "pattern of disability discrimination. 92 While the Court
did point to some state conduct that had been adjudged unconstitutional, 93 its
reliance on other actions as well indicates a shift from Garrett's more
stringent evidentiary requirements. Second, the Lane majority accepted and
relied on evidence derived by a congressional task force.94 In Garrett the
Court criticized the dissent's reliance on evidence from that task force, as
Congress had not itself developed that information and had failed to make its
own findings about disability-related employment discrimination.95  That
89. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000)
(finding the legislative record supporting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's application
to states to be insufficient, as consisting "almost entirely of isolated sentences clipped from floor
debates and legislative reports").
90. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-72; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-86; Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-47 (1999).
91. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989.
92. Id. at 1990.
93. See id. at 1989 (describing some state conduct as "unconstitutional"); id. at 1990 (describing
some state conduct as unconstitutional and citing cases). Indeed, the Chief Justice's dissent
conceded that the Court did cite two cases in which courts found unconstitutional discrimination
against the disabled. See id. at 1997, 2000 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 1991.
95. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966.
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objection was absent from the Lane Court's consideration of the task force's
evidence.96
Finally, Lane considered evidence of unequal treatment of the disabled
over a wide array of public services, including prisons, public schools,
voting, and marriage.9 The Court's broader consideration of evidence calls
into question the relationship between the scope of its holding and the
evidence it considered relevant. The Court ultimately considered and upheld
Title II only as it related to states' provisions of judicial services, even
though Title II referred to public entities' "services, programs and
activities. '98 Thus, while evidence of states' discrimination in areas such as
schools and voting might be relevant to Title II's constitutionality in general,
the Court refrained from considering the constitutionality of those
applications, yet still considered evidence of discrimination in those areas. 99
Title II's broad scope presented a different type of problem than earlier
cases, which generally had considered statutes that focused on one particular
regulatory area.100 Thus, Lane's consideration of a broader array of evidence
is not technically inconsistent with previous cases. Nevertheless, for Lane to
have been truly consistent with the general thrust of those earlier cases, it
would have had to confine its evidentiary review to instances of
discrimination on the topic that was the subject of the Court's ultimate
holding. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent criticized the majority on
exactly this point.'01
96. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 & n. 16.
97. See id. at 1989-1990.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2004).
99. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1990.
100. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 360-62 (considering challenge to statute restricting disability-based
employment discrimination); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (considering
challenge to statute providing remedies for victims of gender-based violence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (considering challenge to statute restricting age-based employment
discrimination); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999) (considering challenge to statute providing remedies for state infringements of patents);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (considering challenge to statute restricting states
from infringing on free religious exercise). Boerne is arguably a broader statute than the others, in
that its protection of free exercise restricted state conduct across a wide variety of areas, from zoning
to public health laws.
101. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1999. In his dissent, the Chief Justice stated:
Rather than limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due process rights on
which it ultimately relies, the majority sets out on a wide-ranging account of societal
discrimination against the disabled.... Some of this evidence would be relevant if the
Court were considering the constitutionality of the statute as a whole; but the Court
rejects that approach in favor of a narrower "as-applied" inquiry.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 n.7 (criticizing the relevance of
much of the supporting evidence relied on by the dissent, since "[tlhe overwhelming majority of [the
examples of state discrimination provided in the dissent's appendix] pertain to alleged discrimination
by the States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which are areas
addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA").
The Court's broader evidentiary focus reflects a significant shift in the
Section 5 doctrine. Its willingness to credit both the task force's evidence,
evidence of potentially constitutional state discrimination, and evidence not
dealing in particular with judicial services suggests that the Court is moving
away from a model in which the Court's relationship to Congress is
analogous to that between an appellate court and a trial court that has
reached a verdict in a litigation. In that model, the reviewing court demands
that that verdict be supported by facts found by that body itself and that are
precisely relevant to the issue at hand. As explained below, the Court's shift
from that model suggests a deeper appreciation for the institutional
differences between courts and Congress.
10 2
B. Evidence of Misconduct by Parties Other Than States
In the course of considering the evidence supporting Title II, the Court
responded to criticism by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, that some of
this evidence revealed discrimination by non-state actors.10 3 The Chief
Justice appears to have meant governmental actors that were sub-state
entities, rather than purely private, non-governmental actors. 1° 4 In response,
the Court added an important footnote that seems to have expanded the
previous doctrine's openness to evidence of conduct by other governmental
units as well as private parties. First, the Court described as "mistaken" the
premise that "a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power must always be
predicated solely on evidence of constitutional violations by the States
themselves."'1 5 The Court then noted that discrimination in the provision of
judicial services should logically be considered state action, because courts
are "typically treated as arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment
purposes."' 1 6 At this point the Court cited cases where courts had looked to
state law to determine whether a particular court was in fact a creature of the
state or of a sub-unit, and had held that they were state creations.' 0 7 Thus,
by this point the Court had put a potentially sizable dent in its pre-Lane
doctrine that non-State activity could never be considered when examining
whether state misconduct justified a Section 5 remedy.
The Court continued, though, to offer both an explanation and historical
support for this relaxed evidentiary requirement. It stated that:
To be sure, evidence of constitutional violations by the States
themselves is particularly important when, as in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999), Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000),
102. See infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
103. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991.
104. See id. at 1999-2000 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 1991 n.16.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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and Garrett, the sole purpose of reliance on § 5 is to place the States
on equal footing with private actors with respect to their
amenability to suit. But much of the evidence in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S., [sic] at 312-315, to which the Chief Justice
favorably refers.., involved the conduct of county and city
officials, rather than the States. Moreover, what THE CHIEF
JUSTICE calls an "extensive legislative record documenting States"
gender discrimination in employment leave policies' in Nevada
Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) in fact
contained little specific evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination on the part of the States. Indeed, the evidence before
the Congress that enacted the FMLA related primarily to the
practices of private-sector employers and the Federal Government.
See Hibbs, 538 U.S., [sic] at 730-735. See also id. at 745-750
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting).10 8
The first sentence of this quotation represents the Court's attempt to
harmonize its broader evidentiary reach in Lane with its narrower ones in
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett. The Court seems to suggest that in
those earlier cases, Congress had used Section 5 simply to place states on an
equal footing with private parties with regard to their liability for damages
and other awards of retrospective relief. Indeed, those earlier cases
considered statutes that regulated states in their capacity as economic actors
- patent infringers in Florida Prepaid1°9 and workplace discriminators in
Kimel,1 ° and Garrett.1 ' By (implicit) contrast, Title II of the ADA - or at
least Title H as applied to the provision of judicial services - might be seen
as regulating the states in their performance of a uniquely governmental
function, that is, adjudicators.
The distinction drawn by the Court is susceptible to different
interpretations. The Court may be suggesting that evidence of non-state
governmental action is simply more probative when the subject area is
uniquely governmental. On this theory the Court might reason that different
levels of state government face similar political and bureaucratic pressures
and temptations, with the result that misconduct by one level with regard to
a uniquely governmental function suggests the possibility of similar
misconduct by others. 1 2 So understood, the Court appropriately pointed to
108. Id. at 1991 n.16 (citations omitted).
109. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647
(1999) (striking down statute that provided a remedy for patent violations by state governments).
110. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking down statute that
regulated states' ability to engage in age-based employment discrimination).
11. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (striking down statute
that regulated states' ability to engage in disability-based employment discrimination).
112. Cf Garrett, 531 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Local governments often work closely
the dissent's favorable invocation of Katzenbach, where misconduct by
county and city officials with regard to voting rights was held to be
sufficiently probative of state misconduct to justify imposing burdens on
states.'13 But this theory is not completely satisfactory, since there is no
reason to doubt that state and sub-state entities also face similar pressures
when, for example, they act as employers or other economic actors. This
explanation simply does not account for the distinction drawn in the
footnote.
On the other hand, the Court's distinction might point to some sort of
heightened proof requirement growing out of a suspicion of Congress'
inferred intent. On this theory the Court might appropriately require more
specific proof of state misconduct in order to rebut a suspicion that Congress
was "really" simply trying to place all participants in interstate commerce
(state and private employers, for example) on the same footing, without any
special concern for either Fourteenth Amendment rights or states'
constitutional sovereignty. This suspicion ultimately derives from the
Court's conception of federalism: the entire reason Congress cannot place
private and public participants in interstate commerce on the same footing
through the commerce power is because of states' special immunity from
retrospective liability. 14 In a sense, this explanation reduces to the Court
imposing a heightened evidentiary requirement to ensure that Congress does
not attempt an end-run around Seminole Tribe."5
Up to this point, the footnote's analysis of the evidentiary issue treads a
careful line in attempting to harmonize the Lane majority's more generous
evidentiary rules with the more restrictive ones in Florida Prepaid, Kimel,
and Garrett, all of which were joined or written by Justice O'Connor, the
Lane majority's fifth vote." 6 It is difficult, however, to read the Court's
characterization of Hibbs as consistent with those cases. Justice Stevens
characterized the record in Hibbs as containing "little specific evidence of a
pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on the part of the States," and as
relating "primarily to the practices of private-sector employers and the
Federal Government."' '7  This characterization of Hibbs places it in the
with, and under the supervision of, state officials, and in general, state and local government
employers are similarly situated.").
113. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 n.16.
114. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261 (1997).
115. It bears repeating that four members of the Lane majority dissented in Seminole Tribe, and
have continued to express their opposition. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92 (Stevens, J., joined by
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting) (expressing continued opposition to Seminole Tribe).
Nevertheless, the need to retain Justice O'Connor's support undoubtedly led Justice Stevens in Lane
to attempt to harmonize earlier Section 5 cases with the result upholding Title II. This effort
occurred even though the harmonization included a principle that was derived from Seminole Tribe,
namely, the inability of Congress to make state government-participants in interstate commerce
equally liable for retrospective relief. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978.
116. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 629 (1999);
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 65; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358.
117. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 n.16; see also id. at 1992 n.17 (noting that Hibbs relied on, among
other evidence, "(1) a Senate Report citation to a Bureau of Labor Statistics survey revealing
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starkest possible contrast to Garrett, which insisted on a "pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination" before a statute will be held to have
satisfied Section 5,8 and insisted that that discrimination be attributable to
the state itself.'19
By characterizing most of the evidence in Hibbs as relating to non-state
entities entirely, Justice Stevens opened the door to a significant expansion
of the type of evidence courts can take into account in determining the need
for Section 5 legislation. He did not act on that characterization in Lane,
instead confining his evidentiary presentation to actions of state
governments and their subdivisions.' 20 Perhaps this was because enough
evidence existed from those actors to craft a defensible case for Title II, or
perhaps it was because Title II, unlike the FMLA, applied largely to
uniquely-governmental functions (especially given the Court's limitation of
its holding to the provision of judicial services). Most basically, Justice
Stevens' failure to apply this characterization of Hibbs may have derived
from the need to keep Justice O'Connor from writing a separate concurrence
that would have deprived him of a majority. Whatever the reason, the fact
remains that his provocative characterization of a prior case provides a lever
with which a future court may further pry open Garrett's narrow evidentiary
focus.
Finally, recall that Hibbs was a case about an employment statute that
regulated states in their capacity as employers, rather than in some uniquely
governmental capacity. Describing that case as having relied on evidence of
private party conduct thus seemingly undermined the Court's own earlier
harmonization of the cases, in which requiring evidence of state misconduct
was especially important "when ... the sole purpose of reliance on § 5 is to
place the States on equal footing with private actors with respect to their
amenability to suit. ', 21 Unless there is something about the gender focus of
the FMLA that absolves Congress of suspicion of relying on Section 5
"solely ... to place the States on equal footing with private actors,"'' 22
Justice Stevens appears by this characterization to have opened an additional
crack in his own explanation of those earlier cases as reflecting this
distinction. Ultimately, it may be that the FMLA's focus on gender
discrimination, which receives heightened scrutiny from the Court, serves to
distinguish Hibbs' more generous evidentiary scope from those in the earlier
disparities in private-sector provision of parenting leave to men and women; [and] (2) submissions
from two sources ... that public-sector parental leave policies differ little from private-sector
policies") (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
118. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
119. See id.
120. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989-91.
121. Id. at 1991 n.16.
122. Id.
cases. Whether this latter distinction can provide a durable basis for these
different approaches, however, is an open question.
C. The Court's Use of Evidence in Lane
Taken together, the Court's examination of the evidence in Lane reveals
a significant change in its understanding of Congress' role under Section 5.
The model in Florida Prepaid, Kimel and Garrett envisioned Congress
acting like an agency or an inferior court, gathering evidence into a record
and making final determinations by applying that evidence to established
law, both of which functions are subject to review by an appellate tribunal.
This analogy is extended by the precision and convincingness the Court has
required of Congress' fact finding. In particular, under those earlier cases
that evidence must reveal (1) a pattern of misconduct, (2) by the states
themselves, not sub-state units (let alone private parties), (3) that is of
precisely the type targeted by the statute (for example, in Garrett,
employment discrimination, not public facility discrimination,) 123 and (4)
that rises to the level of unconstitutional state action.
The Court's high standard for Congress' fact finding in these earlier
Section 5 cases1 24 suggests the constitutional significance it accorded the
countervailing interest in state sovereignty. Just as a deprivation of liberty
requires a court to satisfy the highest proof standard, reached through careful
procedure, so too, cases such as Garrett seemed to say, 125 does deprivation
of a state's sovereign immunity from retrospective relief and the assumed
indignity of having to defend against suits in its own name require precise
and convincing proof. Given this understanding of the Court's approach, it
is not surprising that dissenters in Lane have spoken of a state's Eleventh
Amendment "rights" and have found similarities between those "rights" and
an individual's constitutional rights.
26
By contrast, Lane's use of evidence paints a picture in which Congress'
knowledge of problematic state conduct derives from more than formal
factual investigation, yielding precisely-focused information developed by
Congress itself. First, the Lane Court deemed relevant evidence that was not
precisely focused on either the "proper" wrongdoer (the State), the "proper"
subject of the wrongdoing (access to judicial services), the "proper" legal
standard (unconstitutionality), nor even the "proper" fact finder (Congress
itself). 127 Instead, it credited, respectively, evidence from non-state entities
that addressed issues other than access to judicial services, and that did not
rise to levels of unconstitutional conduct. 128 Moreover, the Court did not
insist that the evidence have been developed by Congress itself. Indeed, in
123. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356
124. See, e.g., Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2000 n3.
125. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
126. See infra note 190.
127. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
128. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 n.16.
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addition to crediting evidence developed by the task force, the Court gave no
indication that Congress was aware of the discriminatory state laws the
Court cited, nor of the litigation in which courts considered claims of illegal
disability discrimination, 29 both of which the Court cited as justifications for
Title 11.30
In the picture that emerges from the Court's consideration of this
evidence, examples of disability-related discrimination in a variety of areas
revealed a general social reality justifying remedial legislation. In holding
that such a picture justified congressional action, the Court implicitly
recognized the difference between Congress and the courts as institutions,
and how that difference affects their authority to act.' In particular,
Congress is - or should be - free from the inherent limitations of the
adjudicative format.12 Congress does not determine individual parties' legal
liability based on existing law; thus it need not be bound by judicial rules of
129. See id. at 1989-1990.
130. Id. at 1994. It should be pointed out that earlier cases such as Garrett focused on judicial
decisions uncovering constitutional violations as the type of evidence that would best support
Section 5 legislation, without requiring that Congress have been aware of those decisions. See, e.g.,
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stressing the lack of court cases finding
unconstitutional disability-based employment discrimination). Thus, it seems that at least with
regard to this type of evidence, those earlier cases did not require congressional awareness. The best
way to explain this is by concluding that the Court viewed such evidence as independently reliable,
and thus probative, evidence of constitutional violations. Obviously, such privileging of judicial
determinations of constitutional right fits within the Court's overall juricentric approach to Section 5.
See generally William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal
Protection, 79 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). For other evidence to be probative, however,
cases like Garrett seem to require congressional consciousness. In Garrett, for example, the Court
not only criticized the task force evidence as not developed by Congress, but then immediately
followed that criticism with the further observation that Congress did not formally find the relevant
facts in its statement of legislative findings. See id. at 370.
131. For longer discussions of how Congress' and the courts' different institutional positions
justify different standards for legislative and judicial action, see William D. Araiza, The Section Five
Power and the Rational Basis Standard, 79 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter "The
Section 5 Power"]; William D. Araiza, Courts, Congress and Equal Protection: What Brown
Teaches Us About the Section 5 Power, 47 How. L. J. 199, 221-226 (2004) (discussing these
institutional differences).
132. See, e.g., Robert Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 n.146 (2003).
Judicial power exists to adjudicate controversies, and it typically involves the assignment
of individual guilt and liability. Because we believe in principles of individual
responsibility, we require courts to function in a way that precludes guilt by association.
Legislatures, by contrast, are forbidden from allocating individual guilt and
responsibility. The essence of legislative power instead lies in the establishment of
general rules of conduct. It is therefore misguided to understand Section 5 legislation as
accusing particular states of wrongdoing, or as punishing them for past misconduct.
Instead Section 5 legislation, like all legislation, seeks to vindicate public values. For this
reason Section 5 legislation, like all legislation, is not to be restricted by rules appropriate
for the proper functioning of a court.
Id.
evidence, burden of proof, and liability. 133 Moreover, because the scope of
Congress' power extends beyond particular parties to a litigation to the
entire nation, its remedies need not be as cabined by the need to avoid
involving innocent third parties or parties over which a court lacks
jurisdiction. 134 Indeed, one way to illustrate the plenary nature of Congress'
power is as a contrast to these limitations on the judicial power. 135 This is
not to suggest that Congress' powers under Section 5 are unlimited.
However, Congress' freedom from the confines of the adjudicative form
clearly gives it more latitude to act than courts. As reflected in Lane, one of
the ways this latitude is felt is in the evidence that can support Section 5
enactments. 136
It is also significant that Lane goes beyond indicating that Congress may
consider a broader set of evidence than a court, to suggest that the evidence
need not have been officially before Congress. 137 When the Court speaks
about Congress acting "against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in
the administration of state services,"' 3 1 it suggests that, quite literally, the
world is Congress' record. 139  Again, this makes sense given Congress'
institutional characteristics. Judicial proceedings are closed systems.
Verdicts must be based on evidentiary records built in the trial, which juries
and judges may not supplement with their own information or investigation,
and information developed during the trial but inappropriately admitted must
not be considered. In such situations it makes perfect sense for appellate
review of a verdict or judicial review of a trial-type administrative
adjudication' 4° to consider whether the decision was supported based only
on the evidence produced in that proceeding.
Congress, however, is situated completely differently from a trial court
or an administrative tribunal. Its legitimacy does not flow from its
procedural fairness, the rigor of its evidentiary rules, or, in the case of an
administrative tribunal, its possession of delegated power. Instead,
Congress' legitimacy derives from the electoral mandate and accountability
of its members and their collective national perspective. Those
characteristics bestow upon it a presumptive understanding and reflection of
133. Id.
134. Cf Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (reversing lower court school desegregation
injunction that involved innocent parties).
135. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112-13 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(contrasting the courts' limited role in combating racial bias and imbalance with Congress'
"discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment") (internal quotation and citation omitted).
136. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1990-92.
137. See id. at 1989.
138. 124 S. Ct. at 1989.
139. As stated earlier, prior cases such as Garrett assumed that Congress could take account of
evidence of court cases.
140. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (2000) (setting forth rules for formal agency adjudications); see
also id. at § 706 (2)(E) (specifying that judicial review of formal, trial-type administrative
procedures must be based only on the record created by the agency).
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the society it represents.' 41 Thus, it is appropriate to presume that Congress
is aware of reasonably public information that supports its position.
This presumption is especially appropriate when Congress makes
judgments about equality. The labeling of a classification as so unfair so as
to be invidious is primarily an exercise in value judgment rather than legal
reasoning. Legal sources do not provide answers to this question: the text of
the Equal Protection Clause merely restates the question, 42 the drafters'
intentions at best do nothing more than cabin the scope of the clause 143 or
reveal an unenlightening concern with "class legislation,"' 44 and precedent
merely reflects decisional methods of earlier courts, which include reference
to social attitudes. 145 For its part, a decisional aid such as the tiered scrutiny
structure, and the suspect class inquiry on which it is built,146 can help courts
reach conclusions about a classification's fairness. But such a theory merely
provides an indirect, political process-based lens that allows courts only to
reach second-order conclusions about the likely fairness of a classification.
Fundamentally, labeling a classification invidious indicates that it
deviates from societal attitudes about which characteristics justify different
treatment with regard to a particular regulatory area and which are
irrelevant. 147 This exercise is inherently value-laden, given that there is no
objective or natural way of knowing which classifications are relevant and
141. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001).
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873) ("We doubt very much whether any
action of a State not directed against the Negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be
held to come within the purview of [the Equal Protection Clause].").
144. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTrruTION BESIEGED (1993) (explaining how the
Supreme Court before the New Deal attempted to apply the equal protection rule against "class
legislation").
145. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been
confined to historic notions of equality.... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change. This Court in 1896 held that laws
providing for separate public facilities for white and Negro citizens did not deprive the
latter of the equal protection and treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment commands.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [1896] [sic]. Seven of the eight Justices then sitting
subscribed to the Court's opinion, thus joining in expressions of what constituted unequal
and discriminatory treatment that sound strange to a contemporary ear. When, in 1954 -
more than a half-century later - we repudiated the "separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy
as respects public education we stated: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 [1954] [sic].
Id. (footnotes omitted).
146. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
147. See generally Harper, 383 U.S. at 669-70; see also Post, supra note 132, at 25-26 (discussing
how the evolution of the Court's gender discrimination jurisprudence depended on changes in
underlying social attitudes as reflected in legislation).
therefore reasonable. 48  The same institutional characteristics that make
Congress presumptively aware of the facts the Lane Court cited - that is, its
electoral accountability and national scope - should make it more qualified
to make judgments about which classifications American society considers
fundamentally unfair. 1
49
Of course, judicially enforceable limits still restrict Congress' presumed
knowledge of empirical reality and the social meaning it can place on that
reality. Most notably, under the Boerne approach Congress must
acknowledge court-made "law" when legislating under its Section 5 power.
For example, the court has made clear that some classification tools (such as
race) are so obviously irrelevant for most legitimate purposes that court-
made law on that topic has solidified into more or less firm rules that cannot
be second-guessed by Congress, short of a long-term shift in fundamental
national attitudes. 5 ° Similarly, the Court's understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a powerful yet limited provision that left significant
autonomy to states' 5' means that Congress cannot impose whatever limits it
wishes on run-of-the-mill state classification decisions and justify them as a
use of its Section 5 power.
148. The Lochner-era Court attempted to find in the common law a natural or objective reference
point by which to judge the reasonableness of legislative classifications. For example, in two cases
from 1936, the Court upheld and struck down different provisions of a New York milk price support
act, based on the extent to which the statute's classifications respectively mirrored and deviated from
the classifications that had emerged from the previously common law-regulated market. Cf
Borden's Farm Prods. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 261-63 (1936) (upholding part of New York milk price
control law because it replicated the conditions found in the previous common-law regulated
marketplace) with Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 272 (1936) (striking down part of
same law because it introduced distinctions unknown to the common law). Reliance on the common
law as the reference point for judging the reasonableness of legislative classifications was a casualty
of the 1937 revolution, just as was reliance on the common law as a reference point for judging
reasonable interferences with the right to contract. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732-
33 (1963) (setting forth extremely broad state latitude to regulate the due process right to conduct
businesses).
149. The Lane Court focused on the due process protections provided by Title II. See Tennessee
v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988-94 (2004). The appropriate role of Congress in determining the
scope of due process rights is different from its analogous role with regard to equality, because the
fundamental inquiries are different: equality is fundamentally a social conclusion rather than a legal
one, and thus requires recourse to different sources and asks different questions. For longer
discussions of this distinction, and of Congress' special role in giving meaning to the equal
protection guarantee, see ENDA, supra note 6, at 61-64; see also The Section 5 Power, supra note
1311.
150. Cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 n.10 (1966) (explaining that Congress' broad
Section 5 power does not extend to limiting constitutional rights); with The Section 5 Power, supra
note 131 (discussing this so-called "ratchet theory"); see also Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 235-36 (1995) (subjecting federal race-based set aside programs to strict scrutiny).
Even with regard to race, however, the suppleness of the Court's equal protection doctrine can never
be underestimated, a point driven home when in the same year as Hibbs, the Court upheld the race
based affirmative action plan in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
151. This view - well-accepted by the Court today despite major disagreements about exactly how
much autonomy states retain - has not always been understood as the correct one. See, e.g.,
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW, 202-03 (1965) (arguing that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment understood it as a revolutionary reduction in the powers of states to the
benefit of the national government).
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But beyond these more or less solid court-made rules there lies a large
area of ambiguity as to the true meaning of equal protection. In that area,
encompassing everything from classifications based on gender to those
based on sexual orientation and disability to those based on other criteria,
courts take less categorical approaches. The Court has recognized that,
despite the general irrelevance of the gender characteristic, the genders are
not fungible, and that some real differences do exist) 52 It has also struck
down at least some sexual orientation and mental retardation classifications
as constitutionally irrational,- 3 and has on occasion even struck down
classic social and economic legislation for the same reason. 54 In such equal
protection gray areas - comprising the vast majority of state regulation -
Congress' presumed knowledge of the world and superiority in according
social meaning to that knowledge should justify judicial deference to Section
5 legislation.
Lane, of course, is more a case about the due process right to judicial
access than the general equality rights of the disabled. Thus, it may be more
appropriate in that case to test Congress' judgment against a legal standard -
as indeed, the Court in Lane did.5 5 But even when, as in Lane, such a legal
standard exists, it remains appropriate to give Congress its due with regard
to its capacity to develop facts relating to that standard. As suggested above,
Lane goes some distance toward re-establishing the appropriate level of
deference to Congress' fact finding abilities.
III. THE CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY OF TITLE H
A. The Facial/As-Applied Issue As Considered by the Court
When the Lane Court turned to consideration of whether Title II was a
congruent and proportional response to the constitutional wrongs identified
as Congress' target, based on the evidence the Court was willing to credit, it
confronted a situation it had not faced in other post-Boerne Section 5 cases.
In Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Morrison, Kimel, and Garrett, the Court had
considered statutes that targeted a particular subject area: religious
discrimination in Boerne, patent infringement in Florida Prepaid, gender-
152. See United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63
(2001) (upholding gender classification based on perceived "real" differences between the genders).
153. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (striking down Colorado Amendment 2 as a
violation of the equal protection rights of gays and lesbians); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (striking down discrimination against the mentally retarded as
unconstitutionally invidious, despite the reasonableness of classifying based on mental retardation in
many cases).
154. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989).
155. See discussion supra Part III (B).
motivated violence in Morrison, and employment discrimination in Kimel
and Garrett. Title II of the ADA was different. It regulated the provision of
"public services," a broad term that covered everything from access to
voting, conditions in penal institutions, and courthouse design. 15 6  Thus,
even after the Court decided that access to judicial proceedings was an
important right, and that Congress had a strong evidentiary basis for
believing that discrimination on that issue was a serious problem, it
nevertheless had to decide how to deal with the fact that Title II dealt with
much more than that topic. 157
The Court's solution to this problem was to limit its holding to Title II's
applicability to judicial access. 158 As support for this as-applied analysis, the
Court cited United States v. Raines,159 a prosecution brought against a state
official under the Civil Rights Act of 1957.160 The official argued that the
statute went beyond Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
because it could be construed to regulate the conduct of private parties. The
defendant then raised an overbreadth argument: even though Congress had
the constitutional power to enact a statute that applied to him, he argued, the
statute was still unconstitutional because it might be understood to apply to
private parties, whose conduct Congress had no authority to regulate.'16  The
Raines Court rejected that argument and allowed the prosecution to go
forward, concluding that that case presented no reason to make an exception
to the general rule against such overbreadth claims, and that, applied to that
defendant, the statute was within Congress' power. 162  So too, the Court in
Lane concluded that, whatever the constitutionality of applying Title II to
state provision of voting, penal or sports spectator services, the statute was
an appropriate tool to ensure judicial access to the courts. 163
156. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1992 (2004) ("Title H - unlike RFRA, the Patent
Remedy Act, and the other statutes we have reviewed for validity under § 5 - reaches a wide array of
official conduct in an effort to enforce an equally wide array of constitutional guarantees."); see also
id. at 1992 n.18 ("Garrett and Florida Prepaid, like all of our other recent § 5 cases, concerned
legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a single constitutional right."). RFRA - the
statute stuck down in Boerne - is in a somewhat different position than the statutes struck down in
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett, notwithstanding the Court's grouping them together. RFRA
was narrow in the sense that it dealt with only one type of discrimination, that which was based on
religious exercise. But that statute nevertheless cut deeply into state prerogatives, from taxing to
historic preservation to every other regulatory area where religious exercise might be burdened. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). Still, Title II is in a real sense broader than
RFRA: while Title II deals only with disability-based discrimination, it also targets the exercise of a
variety of fundamental rights including not just the judicial access rights discussed in Lane, but also,
for example, rights to vote and to humane treatment while in custody. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989-
90 (noting instances of state discrimination with regard to these rights).
157. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
158. See id. at 1993 ("Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation as it
applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services, we need go no
further.").
159. See id. at 1993 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
160. See id. at 1993 n.19.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1993.
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Dissenting in Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist took issue with the
majority's as-applied approach. He instead argued that Title II should stand
or fall as a whole, 64 complaining that Title II was overbroad because
provisions for equal access to transportation, recreation and other programs
had "no permissible prophylactic relationship to enabling disabled persons to
exercise their fundamental constitutional rights."'' 65 He then argued that the
Court cured what he considered Title II's "massive overbreadth"'' 66 by
considering (and upholding) the statute "only 'as it applies to the class of
cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services.""
167
The Chief Justice conceded that the Court normally favored as-applied
rather than facial challenges, but he argued that Boerne's Section 5 analysis
required a different approach. 68  According to him, the congruence and
proportionality test, by measuring the breadth of the statute against the scope
of the right it seeks to enforce and the record of violations it purports to
correct, necessarily implies consideration of the statute as a whole, rather
than as applied to one situation, such as judicial access. 169  In turn, that
holistic consideration required an all-or-nothing decision to either uphold or
strike down the statute.
70
The correctness of the Lane majority's as-applied analysis is crucial to
the scope of Congress' Section 5 power under the congruence and
proportionality test. As a test measuring the reach of a statute in relation to
the harms it seeks to remedy, it requires courts to perform the preliminary
step of determining the scope of both the statute's provisions and the harms
it seeks to remedy. The results of these preliminary inquiries are critical, as
they effectively establish the values for the inputs into the test, and thus
largely determine the outcome. A rough parallel to this process can be
found in the regulatory takings doctrine, where the identification of the
164. See id. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166. See id. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist used the term
"overbreadth" here differently than the way the Raines Court used it. The argument in Raines was
based on an overbreadth analysis in the sense that the defendant was arguing that the statute's
constitutionally questionable application to private parties should have rendered its application to
him, a state official, invalid. This type of overbreadth argument is essentially an argument for third-
party standing - that is for the defendant in Raines to have the right to assert the legal claims of a
private party not before the court. By contrast, the Chief Justice's dissent in Lane used the term
"overbreadth" to refer to the alleged mismatch between Title n1's scope and the scope of the
constitutional right it was alleged to enforce.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1998-99 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's approach is not really an
assessment of whether Title II is appropriate legislation at all... but a test of whether the Court can
conceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic
legislation.") (internal quotation omitted).
affected parcel largely determines the extent of the government's
interference with the property interest. 7 ' As with any test whose result turns
on the proportionality of a challenged action to a countervailing need 172 or
protected right, 173 the description of the scope of the action, need, or right is
crucial to the result that test yields.
The Chief Justice's attack on the majority's as-applied approach
deserves note, as he authored United States v. Salerno,174 the case that
established an extraordinarily strong presumption in favor of as-applied,
rather than facial or overbreadth, constitutional claims. 175  Ironically, his
argument in Lane parallels those of commentators, often critical of Salerno,
who have argued that the appropriateness of as-applied challenges turns
largely not on autonomous principles of judicial practice, but instead, on the
underlying substantive doctrine being applied. 76  For example, Professor
Michael Dorf has argued that so-called "litigation rights," that is, rights,
such as that against self-incrimination, that by definition cannot be asserted
except in a litigation setting, do not present the possibility of chill that
171. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). The
majority stated:
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been
taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical
questions is determining how to define the unit of property whose value is to furnish the
denominator of the fraction.
Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978) (rejecting property owner's argument that its air rights constituted the appropriate unit of
analysis in determining the extent to which its property was taken). Compare Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("The first step [in the congruence and proportionality
analysis] is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue."), and id. at
364 (characterizing this step of the analysis as "determin[ing] the metes and bounds of the
constitutional right in question"), and id. at 372-73 (citing the third step of the congruence and
proportionality inquiry as a comparison between those constitutional rights and the rights and
remedies created by the Section 5 legislation).
172. For example, the Court's Section 5 cases have consistently stated that stubborn or difficult
problems may justify correspondingly more intrusive Section 5 legislation. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
173. In the regulatory takings context, for example, the Court has inquired into the extent to which
the challenged action has infringed on the individual's property interest. See, e.g., Pa. Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (determining that the infringement is minimal because
the challenged landmark designation allowed the property owner to continue using the property for
its originally intended purpose as a train station); see also infra notes 213-215 and accompanying
text (discussing the identification of the right in substantive due process cases).
174. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
175. Id. Facial and overbreadth claims are closely related, with judges and commentators
sometimes not fully distinguishing between the two. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 709 n.7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing what he described as an overly rigid
statement of when facial challenges would be accepted, and illustrating more lenient applications of
the rule against facial challenges by reference to overbreadth claims). Facial and overbreadth
challenges share the characteristic that they are independent of the adjudicative facts relevant to the
party claiming a right, and seek invalidation of the challenged law on the ground that it is more
broadly unconstitutional. See Salerno, 503 U.S. at 317.
176. See, e.g., Richard A. Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000); Marc Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and
the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. REV. 359 (1998); Michael Doff, Facial Challenges to
State and Federal Statutes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 235, 251-83 (1994).
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justifies overbreadth challenges. 177  By contrast, Professor Dorf provides
reasons counseling in favor of a "robust" overbreadth analysis when courts
consider challenges to laws restricting abortions. 78 These examples matter
not because of their necessary rightness or wrongness, but because, like
Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument, they suggest the doctrine-specific
nature of the as-applied/facial decision.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, joined this debate about
whether the congruence and proportionality standard required one or the
other type of analysis. In a footnote, he wrote:
The answer to the question Boerne asks - whether a piece of
legislation attempts substantively to redefine a constitutional
guarantee - logically focuses on the manner in which the legislation
operates to enforce that particular guarantee. It is unclear what, if
anything, examining Title II's application to hockey rinks or voting
booths can tell us about whether Title II substantively redefines the
right of access to the courts.
179
Justice Stevens asks us to look at the issue from the point of the view of
the right Title H is said to protect in this particular litigation: the right of
disabled individuals to access judicial proceedings. 180 Thus, he focused on
the particular application of the statute that enforced that right. 18 ' As he
implied, Title II's application "to hockey rinks or voting booths"'182 said little
about the right of the disabled to access courthouses. By contrast, Chief
Justice Rehnquist focused on the doctrinal test, in particular its nature as an
ends-means fit test. 83 According to the Chief Justice, if statutory breadth is
a key factor in the underlying doctrine - as it is with the congruence and
proportionality test - then it is simply cheating to narrow the statute for
purposes of deciding the case, by considering only its application to the
subject-matter relevant to the plaintiff's claim. 84
177. See Dorf, supra note 176, at 265-66. Facial challenges are closely related to First
Amendment "overbreadth" claims, in which a plaintiff to which a statute can constitutionally be
applied is allowed to challenge his conviction because the statute as written applies to conduct that
would be constitutionally protected. See id. Thus, in an overbreadth challenge a plaintiff can seek
the invalidation of a statute even though it had at least some constitutional application.
178. See Dorf, supra note 176, at 270-71.
179. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993 n.18.
180. See id. at 1978.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184. See id. ("In conducting its as-applied analysis.., the majority posits a hypothetical statute,
never enacted by Congress, that applies only to courthouses. The effect is to rig the congruence-and-
proportionality test by artificially constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a recognized
constitutional right.").
Doctrinal concerns beyond the congruence and proportionality doctrine
itself may have given the dissent further reason to protest against an as-
applied analysis of Title II. After setting forth the doctrinal argument
against as-applied analyses of Section 5 legislation,' the dissent further
complained that under the majority's approach "States will be subjected to
substantial litigation in a piecemeal attempt to vindicate their Eleventh
Amendment rights."'' 86  Chief Justice Rehnquist may have considered this
burden on States to be problematic enough to warrant a facial approach to
the statute, given the current Court's elevation of state sovereign immunity
as a prime constitutional value.1 87  Just as an unconstitutional speech
restriction might chill speech and thereby harm First Amendment values
without a judicial remedy, thereby justifying the unusual step of allowing an
overbreadth claim, 88 so too he may have considered the burden of litigating
their sovereign immunity on a piecemeal basis an unacceptable impairment
of constitutional values, thus justifying a broader analysis of Section 5
legislation. 8 9
This is not to suggest that the dissent's concern is warranted. For
example, any analogy between First Amendment "chill" and Eleventh
Amendment "chill" seems strained. Even assuming that it makes sense to
speak of a state being "chilled" in the exercise of a constitutional "right,"
1 90
the idea that an as-applied approach to Section 5 legislation might chill
states'91 remains somewhat suspect, since the Eleventh Amendment gives
states immunity only from retrospective relief, not from a general, judicially-
enforceable, requirement to obey federal law. 92  Because states can
constitutionally be subjected to federal law based on Article I, the idea that
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1996) (holding that state sovereign
immunity is a sufficiently fundamental component of the federal system as to outweigh
congressional power to regulate under Article I); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending
the constitutional status of state sovereign immunity to include immunity from federal causes of
action brought in state courts, based on the importance of state sovereignty in the underlying plan of
the Constitution).
188. The chilling effect a potentially invalid application of a statute may have on the exercise of
protected rights is one of the main reasons the Court has allowed plaintiffs to assert overbreadth
claims in First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
189. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that the dissent speaks of the state regulatory autonomy as a
state's "Eleventh Amendment rights." Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1997, 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Other recent federalism opinions have described states' sovereign immunity as a right. See, e.g., Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 681-82 (1999)
(analogizing to cases refusing to find that individuals have implicitly waived constitutional rights
when holding that such states should not be held to have constructively waived their sovereign
immunity).
190. See supra note 189; see also Carroll, infra note 217, at 1060-1062.
191. Cf. Doff, supra note 176, at 261-64 (noting the chill rationale for overbreadth challenges to
laws restricting free speech and fundamental rights).
192. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908) (authorizing suits against state officials
for failure to obey federal law); but see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (restricting
Young relief to prospective relief); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548
(1985) (holding that Article I authorizes Congress to impose restrictions on states).
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an overbroad Section 5 statute would chill privileged conduct makes sense
only when Section 5 serves as the only possible constitutional basis for the
federal rule of conduct.' 93 Chief Justice Rehnquist may also have intended
to suggest that states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "rights"'' 94 include
immunity from having to litigate suits against the state eo nomine, in
addition to immunity from awards of retrospective relief. But if so, then the
availability of Ex parte Young suits that are litigated against the state in all
but name surely renders this latter right relatively trivial, and not a
justification for abandoning the normal as-applied approach to constitutional
challenges.
Beyond the dissent's possible (over) concern for sovereign immunity,
the dissent's logic fails at an even more crucial point. Both the dissent and
the majority agree that the crucial inquiry in Boerne is whether the statute
attempts to redefine the substance of constitutional rights, rather than merely
enforce them.195 They also agree that the ultimate question is answered by
the ends-means test described earlier. 196  But it does not follow, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist insists, that courts must perform that test on the statute as
a whole. Certainly pre-Boerne Section 5 cases do not require that
193. Ironically, this may have been the case with Title 1I's application to courthouse access.
Accessing courthouses for purposes of litigating rights or simply attending trials may not constitute
economic activity, and thus regulation might not be feasible under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000) (noting the crucial importance of the
regulated activity's character as economic or non-economic when determining whether Congress can
regulate it under its interstate commerce power). Still, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not limit his call
for facial analysis of Section 5 legislation to statutes whose only possible constitutional basis is
Section 5. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2006 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 1993 n.18 (describing "the question that Boerne asks" as "whether a piece of
legislation attempts substantively to redefine a constitutional guarantee"); id. at 2005 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) ("In applying the congruence and proportionality test, we ask whether Congress has
attempted to statutorily redefine the constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
196. Cf id. at 1986-87 (explaining the congruence and proportionality test) with id. at 2005
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In applying the congruence - and - proportionality test, we ask whether Congress has
attempted to statutorily redefine the constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This question can only be answered by measuring the breadth of a statute's
coverage against the scope of the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the
record of violations it purports to remedy.
Id. It is also worth noting that, save Justice Scalia, no member of the current Court has expressed
disagreement with the basics of the congruence and proportionality test, and that no justice in
Boerne, the case that established that test, dissented from that part of the Court's analysis. Justice
O'Connor dissented on the underlying substantive question of whether the federal statute did in fact
conflict with the properly-understood constitutional rule, but explicitly agreed otherwise with the
Court's congruence and proportionality discussion. See City of Flores v. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 545-
46 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter dissented on the underlying issue without
expressing a view on the Section 5 question, as did Justice Breyer, see id. at 565 (Souter, J.,
dissenting), and see id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Since then, all three of these justices have
either joined or written an opinion applying that test.
approach.' 97 More to the point, as Justice Stevens noted for the majority in
Lane, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett the Court
tested Title I of the ADA against the congruence and proportionality
standard, leaving the rest of the statute for another day (and, of course,
ultimately upholding Title II in Lane itself).198
It might be argued that the Garrett example is inapposite, since that case
considered a complete title of the ADA, while in Lane the Court upheld only
one application of Title II. 99 Indeed, the Chief Justice cited the literal
language of Section 5, stressing the word "legislation" to argue that Title II
had to stand or fall in toto, rather than as applied to the protection of
particular rights.200 But ultimately it is impossible to determine the
appropriate statutory unit of analysis as an abstract matter, divorced from the
underlying substantive doctrine. To a large degree, this issue simply restates
the choice between as-applied and facial decisions, with the choice now
between a larger or smaller statutory unit (e.g., a title as opposed to a
section). 20 ' There is no way to determine that a particular text is a naturally
or inherently independent and self-contained unit whose constitutionality
must stand or fall as a whole, independent of other statutory text.20 2  For
example, the ADA was enacted as a package; 20 3 thus, if a unit of
197. Raines upheld one application of a provision of the 1957 Voting Rights Act while avoiding
the difficult constitutional question that would arise from its application to a different type of
defendant. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). Katzenbach v. Morgan considered the
constitutionality of Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, not the entire statute. Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Indeed, Section 4(e) was upheld as legislation to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, while the rest of the statute was upheld as appropriate enforcement of the
Fifteenth. Id. In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court reached split decisions not only as between the
constitutionality of Title HI and Title HI of the Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970, but even as
between different applications of Title m. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
198. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992 n.18.
199. See id. at 1997, 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
But Title II is not susceptible of being carved up in this manner; it applies
indiscriminately to all "services," "programs," or "activities" of any "public entity."
Thus, the majority's approach is not really an assessment of whether Title H is
"appropriate legislation" at all, but a test of whether the Court can conceive of a
hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic legislation.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
200. See id.
201. Of course, some as-applied decisions, such as the one in Lane itself, distinguish between
applications within one statutory provision. See id. at 1992. But the comparison still holds. In
Lane, the Court essentially read § 12132 as a text requiring reasonable accommodations for the
disabled in the provision of a long list of public services, and limited its holding simply to one
service on that list, judicial access. See id. at 1994.
202. It is important to note that this is a different issue than the one presented by classic
severability doctrine. Under that doctrine, a statute's severability is a matter of congressional intent;
essentially, a court must ask itself whether Congress, if it had known that a particular provision was
unconstitutional, nevertheless would have enacted the rest of the statute. See, e.g., Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1013-1014 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
discussion in the text considers whether the proper constitutional analysis of a given statute requires
that it be upheld or struck down in toto. Id. To the extent that the Court's decision on that issue
represents a use of the Court's power to interpret the Constitution, it presumably is not subject to
overruling by a legislative choice.
203. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
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"legislation" is understood as a single, omnibus legislative choice expressed
at a single moment through language, then presumably the ADA should
stand or fall as a whole.204 At the other extreme, the Court often considers
particular sections of broad enactments in isolation when it reviews their
legality. Appropriations riders are prime examples. °5 In sum, in the search
for the appropriate unit of legislation to subject to judicial review, a priori
rules seem destined to fail. In turn, this insight suggests the wisdom of an
approach where the search for the appropriate analytical unit turns on the
underlying substantive doctrine.
Indeed, the Court's as-applied approach to the congruence and
proportionality test makes sense from the point of view of both judicial
practice and underlying doctrine. First, the Court's party-centered approach
to the issue focuses on the effect of the statute on the case before the Court,
with all the benefits that posture brings from the perspective of good judicial
practice. In particular, that approach has the benefit of avoiding
consideration of factual issues; for example in Lane, the state's failure to
make sports arenas handicapped-accessible, that presumably do not matter to
the plaintiffs, that are unlikely to be adequately briefed,2 °6 and as to which
207disagreements may never have arisen. These concems are especially
relevant in the particular context of Section 5 doctrine, since that doctrine
accords great importance to the pervasiveness of the constitutional violations
the statute attempts to remedy. When it is unclear whether, and to what
extent, those violations exist, and when the parties to the case are
uninterested in or unable to enlighten the court, good judicial practice
suggests that the court avoid analyzing those violations.
By contrast, an approach that required consideration of the statute in all
its applications would require a court to create a comprehensive list of rights
and remedies that would presumably have to be tallied up and compared to
all the conceivable burdens Title II imposed on states to determine whether,
as a whole, Title II was a congruent and proportional safeguard for all the
Fourteenth Amendment rights that it protected. Despite its disagreement
with the majority's as-applied approach, the dissent performed this analysis
204. Cf Dorf, supra note 176, at 249-51 (describing as-applied approaches to statutes as adopting
a presumption that statutes are severable for purposes of judicial review). This statement assumes
away even more difficult issues that would arise under an intent approach when considering statutes
that amend previous statutes, or even statutes that impliedly repeal or alter judicial interpretations of
pre-existing statutes.
205. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (considering a challenge
to the constitutionality of § 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-21, 103 Stat. 701).
206. This consideration obviously speaks to the third-party standing component of facial
challenges. See generally Fallon, supra note 176, at 1359-61.
207. See Carroll, infra note 217, at 1050-51 (expressing similar concerns).
in only the most perfunctory way.2 °8 In particular, it noted the majority's
argument that Title II protected fundamental rights beyond judicial access,
but then dismissed it with the observation that Title II applied to a variety of
programs that did not apply to fundamental rights, and thus was
overbroad.20 9 That summary analysis was obviously incomplete as a full
tallying up and comparison of Title II's rights and remedies.1 ° It failed to
give a detailed consideration to the rights Title II protected, whether
fundamental or non-fundamental, and similarly failed to analyze the scope of
protection Title II provided for rights beyond the judicial-access rights relied
on by the majority.2 11 Moreover, the dissent's analysis failed to account for
Congress' authority under Section 5 to remedy violations of non-
fundamental rights, even though non-fundamental rights have been protected
by the Court in recent years.21 2 The incompleteness of the dissent's analysis
might be excusable, given its need to focus on the as-applied analysis
actually employed by the dissent; in general, a dissent cannot be expected to
provide a full application of its alternative approach. But the type of
analysis the dissent's approach would require cautions against that approach.
Finally, an as-applied analysis leaves ample room for a coherent
application of the congruence and proportionality formula. Applying that
formula only to the particular right at issue in that case provides a
meaningful test of the ultimate Boerne question - whether Congress is
creating or enforcing constitutional rights. Such an inquiry would still catch
over-aggressive congressional action if the statute deterred state conduct to a
degree that severely outran the corresponding constitutional right. For
example, the Court's post-Boerne jurisprudence, even after Lane, makes it
doubtful that the Court would uphold, as congruent and proportional, Title
II's requirement that sports arenas be made accessible to the disabled in
order to vindicate their due process rights to access such venues.
Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that such an approach would always
produce a result upholding the law: "In Garrett, for example, Title I might
have been upheld 'as applied' to irrational employment discrimination; or in
Florida Prepaid, the Patent Remedy Act might have been upheld 'as
applied' to intentional, uncompensated patent infringements. '2 a  His
208. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1997-2007 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
210. See id.
211. For example, the dissent did not address the extent to which Title H protected voting rights,
or the extent to which Title II required states to make non-fundamental right services accessible. See
id. at 1993-1994 (discussing implementing regulations regarding the accessibility steps Title II
required governments to take).
212. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state sodomy law on due
process grounds without formally finding an underlying fundamental right); BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (striking down punitive damages award as "grossly excessive" and thus a
violation of due process). Given that the Court has struck down state government action under the
Due Process Clause even though the rights were not denominated fundamental, it would be
anomalous for the Court to forbid completely Section 5 legislation enforcing such non-fundamental
rights.
213. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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argument - essentially that the impossibility of finding a principled way of
carving up Section 5 statutes into particular applications requires that they
not be divided up at all, but instead be treated as a whole - raises an
interesting comparison to his and especially Justice Scalia's approach to
substantive due process. Justice Scalia has argued that the due process right
at issue should be identified at the most specific level possible, to protect
against a judge subjectively casting the right at a high level of abstraction
and thus finding it fundamental.1 4 In nearly a mirror opposite approach,
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in Lane that the impossibility of a principled
way of carving up Section 5 statutes for analysis required that they be
considered in toto.
2 15
The Chief Justice's argument, however, is hard to credit. Carving up a
statute to consider as-applied challenges obviously requires judgment in
determining where to make the cut. But that judgment need not be
unprincipled. One limiting factor is the nature of the plaintiffs claim. For
example, the plaintiffs' claims in Lane meant that the right to judicial access
- its importance and the extent to which a statute was necessary to vindicate
it - would be a central part of the analysis. As another example, the plaintiff
in Florida Prepaid alleged that the state had engaged in willful patent
infringement, leading Justice Stevens to argue in dissent that the Court
should have confined its review of the statute to instances of willful
infringement.2 6 Indeed, the nature of the plaintiffs claim is crucial, since
the Court's power to determine a statute's constitutionality derives from its
duty to grant relief to and at the behest of injured plaintiffs.1 7
In turn, the nature of the plaintiff's claim presents the Court with options
regarding the particular application of the statute on which it will rule. Thus,
in Lane, the plaintiffs' status as disabled people seeking access to
courthouses allowed the Court to choose between considering Title II as
applied to the right of courthouse access, enforcing more generally the equal
214. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.
plurality opinion); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-722 (1997). Chief Justice
Rehnquist was the only justice to join Justice Scalia's footnote six in Michael H. Glucksberg was
authored by the Chief Justice, and Justice Scalia joined that opinion.
215. See Lane, 124 U.S. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
216. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 652-54
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the proper question before the Court was the
constitutionality of applying the Patent Remedy Act to willful infringers, given the fact that the
plaintiff in that case alleged that the state had willfully infringed on its patent).
217. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (explaining that courts possessed the power
of judicial review as part of its obligation to decide cases and grant relief at the behest of injured
plaintiffs); see also Catherine Carroll, Section Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to
Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1026, 1049 (2003). This vision of the Court also underpins its insistence that the requirements of
injury, causation and redressability are constitutionally-mandated components of Article III standing
doctrine. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (explaining the constitutional nature of
those requirements).
protection rights of the disabled. By contrast, in Garrett, the lack of
constitutional protection for government employment generally meant that
the Court had no option but to consider Title I as an attempt to enforce the
general equal protection rights of the disabled.
The identification of these rights, just like the plaintiff's claim from
which is derives, is extrinsic to Section 5 doctrine. The process of
identifying them thus provides an objective basis for determining how to
carve up a Section 5 statute for purposes of constitutional analysis. Indeed,
this is the fundamental point made by Justice Stevens when he argued that
the Court's decision to consider Title II only as applied to courthouse access
was consistent with the Boerne inquiry.218 By taking as a starting point
Boerne's insistence that Congress not redefine Fourteenth Amendment
rights, Justice Stevens focuses the inquiry on the right at issue. Because the
plaintiffs had no concern with access to hockey rinks or voting booths, and
because Section 5's impact on the right they were concerned about -judicial
access - could be examined without reference to those other topics, it is
legitimate and principled for the Court to restrict its analysis and holding as
it did. Thus, contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument, it is thus not
unprincipled for the Court in Lane to focus on a particular right - in that
case, the right to courthouse access - with all its unique requirements and
limitations, 21 9 as the lens through which it could decide how to divide Title
HI into its various applications.
As commentators have argued220 - and indeed, as both the majority and
dissent in Lane agreed221 - the appropriate scope of the Court's review must
turn on the logic of the underlying substantive constitutional doctrine. It
also necessarily turns on the plaintiffs allegations, since those allegations
structure the case as it reaches the Court and thus provide the Court with
legitimate methods of widening or limiting the scope of its analysis.222 As
noted above, the majority and dissent joined battle on these issues. It is the
result of that battle, rather than a concern about the Court limiting its
consideration of Title II to only constitutional applications, that should
determine the logic of the Court's decision to limit its holding in Lane.
218. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93 n.18.
219. See id. at 1994 (explaining the scope of the right to access judicial proceedings).
220. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 176, at 238-39; Fallon, supra note 176, at 1324.
221. See discussion supra notes 170-184 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 653-54.
While I disagree with the Court's assumption that [merely negligent patent infringements
by the state deprive the patent holder of property], the Daniels line of cases
[distinguishing between negligent and willful state action] has only marginal relevance to
this case: Respondent College Savings Bank has alleged that petitioner's infringement
was willful. The question presented by this case, then, is whether the Patent Remedy
Act... may be applied to willful infringement...
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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B. Title M's Fit As Applied to Judicial Access
Even as applied only to courthouse access, the Court divided on Title
II's congruence and proportionality.223  The majority tied Title II's
requirements to states' due process-based obligations to provide access to
judicial processes.224 It noted that the due process doctrine required access
to the courts only "'within the limits of practicability,"' 22' and found that
requirement to parallel Title II's provision that compliance required only
"reasonable modifications" of courthouses.226 In essence, the majority
placed Title 11's "reasonable modification" mandate within the constitutional
tradition that cost and convenience did not authorize withholding meaningful
access to courts.
227
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent took issue with this analysis. He
stressed that Title II was not limited to exclusions that actually amounted to
constitutional violations.228 Thus, in his view, Title II swept more broadly
than the underlying due process guarantee.2 29 This was especially true, he
suggested, "in light of the lack of record evidence showing that inaccessible
courthouses cause actual Due Process violations. '230  Thus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the majority's analogy between Title II and the due
process judicial access cases, for the simple reason that those latter cases had
found actual due process violations that were not proven to exist in the
situations regulated by Title 11.231
This dispute, perhaps more than any in Lane, highlights the
fundamentally different approaches taken by the majority and the main
dissent.232  The dissent's approach is remarkable for insisting on an
extraordinarily tight fit between a Section 5 statute and the underlying
constitutional violations against which it seeks to enforce. The Chief
Justice's dissent appears to give almost no leeway for a statute to do more
than correct a situation that, if brought to a court, would be adjudged a
constitutional violation. At most, the dissent allows Congress the possibility
223. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
224. See id. (citing cases finding affirmative state obligations to waive certain filing fees, and to
provide indigent criminal defendants with free trial transcripts and counsel).
225. Id. at 1994 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
226. See id. at 1993-94 (discussing Title II's implementing regulations).
227. See id. at 1994 (stating that Title H's duty to provide reasonable modifications to courthouses
"is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that 'within the limits of
practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard' in its
courts") (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1979)).
228. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2006 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Justice Scalia dissented separately. See infra notes 274-80 and accompanying text.
of uncovering actual constitutional violations that had not previously been
brought to the Court's attention.
In this respect, the Rehnquist dissent is clearly in the tradition of his
majority opinion in Garrett. The Garrett decision rejected a large amount of
evidence of disability-based discrimination as justifying Title I, concluding
that the evidence did not establish the existence of constitutional
violations.233 Similarly, Justice Kennedy's concurrence found it relevant
that few court cases had been brought alleging unconstitutional disability-
based employment discrimination. 234 The Garrett majority, Kennedy's
concurrence, and Rehnquist's Lane dissent all insist that the Section 5 power
can be exercised only as a direct and precise response to actual constitutional
violations. Indeed, despite the dissent's stated adherence to the idea that
Section 5 allows Congress to sweep more broadly than the underlying
violation,235 the logic of these opinions leads ineluctably to a vision of the
Section 5 power that allows Congress to do little more than generalize the
particular, case-specific judicial results under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In that sense, the Chief Justice's dissent is not terribly far from the approach
Justice Scalia announced in his separate dissent in Lane.236
By contrast, the majority's analysis of the fit requirement allows
Congress to prescribe a rule of conduct in the absence of a showing that the
rule is itself constitutionally compelled, as long as that rule tracks analogous
constitutional requirements.237 The majority's analysis can be thought of as
allowing Congress to supplement judge-made constitutional doctrine by
applying the principles underlying that doctrine to new situations. Under
this view, constitutional litigation yields principles that sketch the broad
outlines of a doctrine. In turn, that doctrine functions as the guideposts
keeping Section 5 legislation within its proper realm of enforcing, but not
defining, the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under this approach, then, in Lane, previous litigation dealing with
disability-based discrimination and access to judicial services led to the
development of doctrine - the judicial recognition that disability-based
discrimination can sometimes offend the Constitution, and that cost and
233. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
234. See id. at 375-76.
235. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2006. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Title II requires substantially more than the Due Process Clause. Title 11 subjects States
to private lawsuits if, inter alia, they fail to make reasonable modifications to
facilities .... Yet the statute is not limited to occasions when the failure to modify
results, or will likely result, in an actual due process violation ....
Id. at 2006 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted); Cf. with id. at 2007, 2009
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in § 5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, to prevent, or 'remedy' conduct that does not itself violate any
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (emphasis in original), and id. at 2010 ("[W]hat § 5 does
not authorize is so-called 'prophylactic' measures, prohibiting primary conduct that is itself not
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment ....") (original emphasis omitted and new emphasis
added).
237. See id. at 1994.
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convenience do not justify denying access to courts. In turn, Congress can
"enforce" that doctrine through legislation applying those principles to a
new fact pattern - the denial of courthouse access to the disabled.
According to the Lane majority, Congress' rule on that issue - Title II's
"reasonable accommodation" requirement - was congruent and proportional
because it responded to the possibility that disability discrimination can be
constitutionally problematic and tracked the rule the Court had developed
for courthouse access in particular.
2 38
One might roughly analogize this structure to Justice Harlan's approach
to substantive due process, where enumerated constitutional rights provided
the outlines of what he called "a rational continuum" that demarcated the
content of the liberty protected by the Due Process clause.239 So too in
Section 5 doctrine, court-made law enunciating Fourteenth Amendment
rights provides the outlines of a continuum that Congress, subject to a
judicial check, can fill in. While Justice Harlan's approach required judges
to use legal reasoning to determine the outer limits of liberty's rational
continuum, Lane's approach to Section 5 allows Congress to use its
institutional advantages - its presumed superior knowledge of the empirical
world and the social meanings attached to it, and its freedom from the
limitations of the adjudicative format - to determine which legislative rule
best connects the dots provided by constitutional doctrine. The statutory
result is not immune from judicial review, but, as performed in Lane, that
review respects the appropriate roles of courts and Congress.
C. Congress' Power to Establish a Disparate Impact Rule
A final important component of Lane concerns Congress' power to ban
state actions that have a disparate impact on protected constitutional values.
In the course of explaining the breadth of the Section 5 power, Justice
Stevens wrote that "[w]hen Congress seeks to remedy or prevent
unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic
legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in
intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause., 240
This sentence appeared in the opinion after the Court had noted statements
in earlier cases that the Section 5 power included the power to enact
prophylactic legislation that could go beyond conduct prohibited by the
amendment itself.241' The Court's description of the Section 5 power
238. Id. at 1993.
239. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of
jurisdiction).
240. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986.
241. See id. at 1985-86; see also id. at 1985 (stating that the Section 5 power "includes 'the
authority both to remedy and deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the
included a discussion of Hibbs, which it described as upholding the "FMLA
as a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power to combat unconstitutional sex
discrimination, even though there was no suggestion that the State's leave
policy was adopted or applied with a discriminatory purpose that would
render it unconstitutional under the rule of Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney.
242
Justice Stevens' description of Hibbs was accurate.243 His statement
about the prophylactic nature of the Section 5 power had also been common
ground among the justices until Lane itself, where Justice Scalia partially
defected from this consensus. 244  Nevertheless, the general nature of the
statement in Lane that Congress has the power to ban practices that yield
discriminatory effects "to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal
Protection Clause"2 45  suggests potentially broad congressional power.
Before Lane, the Court in the post-Boerne period had expressly approved of
enforcement legislation targeting discriminatory effects only in the field of
race.246  But because race, like gender, is a classification tool that yields
heightened judicial scrutiny, the Court's statement in Monterey County is
more easily cabined. By contrast, the statement in Lane leaves a tool that
the Supreme Court and lower courts may be able to pick up and use in the
future.
The importance of that statement lies in its generality. As recent cases
such as Romer v. Evans247 and Grutter v. Bollinger248 have shown, the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause do not slavishly track the
formal levels of scrutiny accorded particular classifications.249 Thus, the
Amendment's text"') (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)) (internal
quotation omitted, brackets in original).
242. Id. at 1986 (citing Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)). Feeney held that
heightened scrutiny of gender classifications would apply only when the government had purposely
classified on that basis. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
243. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Hibbs complained that while the evidence supporting
the FMLA "could perhaps support the charge of disparate impact, but not a charge that States have
engaged in a pattern of intentional discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment." Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 749-50.
244. See infra notes 274-80 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in Lane).
245. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986.
246. See Monterey County v. Lopez, 525 U.S. 266 (1999). The question in Monterey County was
whether application of those requirements would violate federalism when a county covered by the
Act sought to implement changes in voting procedures mandated by the law of California, which
was not itself a covered jurisdiction. Id. at 266. The Monterey County Court, citing Boerne's
recognition that Section 5 allows Congress to proscribe more conduct than that which would itself
violate the Constitution, reaffirmed pre-Boerne precedent explicitly, holding that in appropriate
circumstances Congress "may guard against both discriminatory animus and the potentially harmful
effect of neutral laws .... Id. at 283. The "appropriate circumstances" caveat derives from the fact
that the Voting Rights Act's pre-clearance requirements apply only to particular jurisdictions that
both suffered from low voter turnout or registration rates and maintained literacy, good character or
analogous voter qualification tests. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b)-c (2000).
247. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
248. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
249. For linguistic simplicity, I refer to the "requirements" of the Equal Protection Clause. In
another forum I have argued that much of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
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strict scrutiny applied in Grutter did not mean fatal scrutiny, and the
ostensible rational basis review in Romer did not mean a victory for the
state.250  Because the Court's tiered scrutiny structure does not yield
predictable results, the Court's statement that Congress can target
discriminatory effects in order to enforce the equal protection guarantee
potentially widens the scope of permissible legislative action under Section
5. In particular, it provides a potential opening for Congress to act when it
perceives that irrational or animus-based discrimination threatens the goal of
equal protection.
Of course, the Court's statement is quite general, and largely reflects the
consensus view that Section 5 authorizes at least some prophylactic
legislation.25' Still, it is significant that the Court explicitly recognized
Congress' power to target discriminatory effects as a general principle of
Section 5 doctrine, decoupled from a situation where the Section 5 statute
seeks to enforce racial or gender equality. As the Court suggested in Hibbs,
states' use of race or gender as the classification tool effectively puts a
thumb on the scale in favor of congressional power. 52 By stating the rule
more generally, decoupled from that halo effect, Justice Stevens may have
taken a step toward expanding congressional power to remedy
discrimination against non-suspect classes.
In the final analysis, though, whether that statement ripens into a more
robust Section 5 power will depend on the Court's application of the
statement's caveat - that Congress has the power to regulate discriminatory
effects in order "to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection
Clause. '253 The ultimate importance of Justice Stevens' hint will depend on
how stringently the Court reviews Congress' determination that
unconstitutional conduct is afoot that requires a legislative response.254
reflects less an authoritative statement of what the Constitution requires, and more a prudential
unwillingness to strike laws down when the Court may not be able to discern with confidence
whether a given law violates the Constitution. See generally The Section 5 Power, supra note 13 1.
250. The same might also be said of the Due Process Clause, although Lane mentions
congressional enforcement only of equal protection. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (striking down sodomy law as violation of the due process right to intimate conduct, despite
never formally identifying that right as fundamental and engaging in strict scrutiny), and BMW of
N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (striking down punitive damages award as violating due
process without expressly stating a standard of review).
251. But see Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (abandoning, except in the race
context, the idea that Section 5 authorizes Congress to enact prophylactic legislation regulating
primary conduct beyond that which is illegal under the Fourteenth Amendment itself).
252. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 135.
253. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986.
254. In Boerne the Court cited an insufficient legislative record in rejecting an argument that
RFRA should be seen as within Congress' power because it targeted effects in order to enforce
against willful discrimination. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 530, 536 (1997). In particular,
RFRA's defenders at the Court noted that the Court had upheld such statutory effects on this theory,
citing cases upholding the Voting Rights Act and federal legislation mandating race-based set-
More fundamentally, it will also depend on the Court's willingness to
moderate its juricentric approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. In
particular, if the Court is willing to acknowledge that much of its equal
protection jurisprudence consists not of authoritative determinations of what
the Constitution requires, but instead of acknowledgements that the Court
cannot discern the actual constitutional rule, then more room should exist for
Congress to determine what is necessary "to carry out the basic objectives"
of the amendment.255 Until then, the Court's hint will remain nothing but a
restatement of the generally acknowledged prophylactic nature of the
Section 5 power, though pregnant with the possibility of a more robust
conception of that power.
IV. SECTION 5 AFTER HIBBS AND LANE
The Court's recent change of course in its Section 5 jurisprudence raises
questions about the fate of congressional enforcement legislation that might
be enacted in the future. At least two pieces of such legislation are currently
under some level of consideration or anticipated consideration: a renewal of
the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) that expire in 2007
and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). Given the Court's
more restrictive Commerce Clause jurisprudence recently, 56 a renewal of
the VRA would likely be constitutionally justifiable only under Congress'
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments, presumably the Fifteenth. 57
ENDA, which would restrict sexual orientation-based employment
2581discrimination, would apply to most employers, private and public, and on
that ground would most likely be authorized by Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce, even as that power has been trimmed in recent years.
However, because legislation enacted under the Interstate Commerce and
other Article I powers may not abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits
asides, and argued that RFRA should be viewed similarly. See id. at 529. The Court did not reject
the premise of the argument, instead concluding that those other statutes were better supported by
the legislative record documenting the scope and intractability of the problem. See id. at 530 ("A
comparison between RFRA and the Voting Rights Act is instructive. In contrast to the record which
confronted Congress and the judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks
examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.").
See also id. ("[Tihe appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil
presented .... ").
255. For an argument to this effect, see generally The Section 5 Power, supra note 131.
256. See generally United States v. Morrison, 537 U.S. 863 (2003); United States v. Lopez, 124 S.
Ct. 2925 (2004).
257. The original Voting Rights Act was upheld as an appropriate exercise of Congress' power to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Renewals of this act were also upheld. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180-182
(1980); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999). The analysis in this Article would most
likely apply to a challenge to legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 n.8
(2001) (noting that Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment "virtually identical" to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
258. See ENDA, supra note 6, at 22-24.
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seeking damages and other retrospective relief,259 ENDA lawsuits against
state employers seeking such relief, for example, back pay or damages
awards, would require that statute to be authorized by Section 5.260 This part
of the article considers these issues in light of the new understanding of
Section 5 ushered in by Lane, and, where relevant, by Hibbs.
A. VRA Renewal After Lane
The Lane majority is fragile, dependent largely on Justice O'Connor's
unsteady adherence to a more generous reading of Congress' Section 5
power.26' Whether that fragile majority would cohere in a challenge to VRA
renewal is an open question. It may be that the VRA's direct focus on racial
discrimination in voting will convince the Court to review it more
deferentially. Hibbs provides an analogy. In that case, the six-justice
majority upheld the FMLA largely because the statute addressed gender
discrimination, which the Court itself considers a significant constitutional
concern. 262  In turn, the constitutional concern triggered by gender
discrimination both yields greater judicial scrutiny and makes it easier for
Congress to demonstrate the existence of a problem warranting a legislative
response. Similarly, because the VRA directly targets an explicit
constitutional value, 263 and, indeed, because the Court itself has identified
259. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
260. For an analysis of ENDA's Section 5 basis before Hibbs and Lane, see generally ENDA,
supra note 6.
261. As suggested throughout much of this Article, Lane's approach to Section 5 is difficult to
reconcile with much of Court's previous Section 5 jurisprudence, thus making Justice O'Connor's
future stance on these issues critical. For his part, the position of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted
to uphold the FMLA in Hibbs but has voted to strike down or, in the case of Monterey County, limit,
every other Section 5 statute in the Boerne era, is at least partly explainable by the fact that the
FMLA targeted discrimination that the Court itself subjected to heightened scrutiny. But see City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 206-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a decision to uphold the
Voting Rights Act's requirement that covered jurisdictions not change any voting procedure that
would disparately impact minority voters); Monterey County, 525 U.S. at 288 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (refraining from reading the Voting Rights Act broadly because of
constitutional concerns). Another possibility, whose correctness is impossible to determine, is that
Chief Justice Rehnquist is simply sufficiently favorably disposed to gender equality as to overcome
federalism-based objections he might otherwise have to Section 5 legislation. See Robert Post,
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 18-19 (2003)
(suggesting this hypothesis).
262. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
263. A slight distinction between gender discrimination in general and racial discrimination with
regard to voting is that the former is a value not explicitly enshrined in the Constitution, but instead a
product of judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197-98 (1976). By contrast, the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits racial discrimination
with regard to voting. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. But for present purposes this is a distinction
without a difference. The important similarity here is that the Court recognizes both of these
phenomena as constitutionally problematic. That fact in turn tightens the analogy between Hibbs'
increased deference to congressional action and the appropriate level of deference to VRA renewal.
both components of that value - racial equality and the right to vote - as
important enough to trigger searching judicial scrutiny in their own rights,26 4
the Court might be willing to give Congress significant latitude to enact a
VRA renewal.265
In particular, Hibbs' deference to legislation enforcing a judicially
recognized constitutional value might ease one of the problems with regard
to VRA renewal, the lack of recent explicit constitutional violations. Recall
that, in cases such as Garrett, the Court insisted on congressional fact
findings that revealed a significant number of constitutional violations by the
states.266 Commentators have questioned whether Congress could identify
such violations in VRA context, given the VRA's success in preventing
them.267 However, if the members of the Hibbs majority - especially Justice
O'Connor and most especially Chief Justice Rehnquist 261 - are serious about
"it [being] easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations" when the Court itself scrutinizes infringements of that right more
closely, 269 then that majority should be expected to accord Congress
significant deference on the question of the need for VRA renewal.
The source of that constitutional difficulty in either explicit text or judicial interpretations thereof is
insignificant. At any rate, the two components of the Fifteenth Amendment's concerns - voting and
racial equality - have been identified as fundamental constitutional concerns in their own rights. See
infra note 264.
264. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (fight to vote); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (right to vote); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964) (racial classification).
265. Perhaps significantly, Justice O'Connor, writing only for herself in a pre-Boerne case not
implicating Section 5, described congressional power to eradicate racial discrimination as "ample."
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). As noted in an earlier
footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist's position on this question is unclear, given his votes in earlier
cases. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
266. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,368-70 (2001).
267. See Richard Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2005).
268. See supra note 261.
269. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
270. Professor Vikram Amar considers this part of Hibbs' approach to Section 5 as "cheat[ing] a
bit as to the key issue," namely, the frequency of state constitutional violations and the
proportionality of Congress' legislative response. Vikram David Amar, The New 'New Federalism,
6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 353 (2003). In particular, Professor Amar, comparing Hibbs to Garrett,
argues that "[t]o say that gender classifications are subject to a more stringent standard of review
than are disability classifications doesn't really tell us how often States are violating the
constitutional rights of women versus the constitutional rights of the disabled." Id.
This Article's speculation about the VRA and future Section 5 legislation takes the Court's
approach in Hibbs as a given. Nevertheless, in at least partial defense of that approach, it seems
reasonable, despite Professor Amar's argument, for a court to believe that the general
unreasonableness of a classification based on a trait such as gender makes it more likely that any
instances of gender discrimination identified by Congress will be instances of unconstitutional state
conduct. It may well be, as Professor Amar seems to suggest, that in Hibbs the Court did not
identify a materially larger number of discrimination instances than the Court acknowledged in
Garrett; thus, what he calls the "standard-of-review-differential" between the two classifications
does not matter. See id. But the more theoretical point remains that a heightened standard of review
makes it likely that whatever discrimination instances are in fact identified will be unconstitutional.
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Hibbs does not mean that VRA renewal will get a free pass on the
evidentiary issue; as in Lane and Hibbs itself,271 the Court will presumably
examine the legislative record for examples of relevant discrimination.
However, Hibbs does suggest that the VRA's success in suppressing racial
discrimination in voting should not block its renewal. In particular, Hibbs'
lighter burden of proof should allow Congress to make the case for renewal
through more indirect evidence of state misconduct.272 Indeed, it might even
mean that the decades-old evidence supporting earlier renewals and the
original act itself might suffice.273
Justices inclined to uphold VRA renewal might find an unlikely ally in
Justice Scalia. In Lane, Justice Scalia abandoned the congruence and
proportionality test, and announced that, with the exception of statutes
targeting racial discrimination, he would henceforth vote to strike down
Section 5 legislation that prohibited primary conduct itself not forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment.274 With respect to Section 5 legislation
targeting race discrimination, however, he announced that for reasons of
stare decisis275 and the Fourteenth Amendment's original concern for racial
equality, 276 he would apply Katzenbach's more generous test derived from
Article I's Necessary and Proper Clause.277 Justice Scalia embraced a
stricter version of that test, however, stating that he would vote to allow
Congress to impose requirements only on states "in which there has been an
identified history of relevant constitutional violations., 278 He also stated that
such legislation would have to be directed against state actors, rather than
271. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735.
272. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 267 (recounting other commentators' suggestions for how to
prove the continued need for the VRA in light of the statute's success in suppressing the most
egregious forms of race-based voting discrimination).
273. Beyond such speculation, there is always the possibility that new evidence of race-based state
action restricting voter rights might be enough under the Hibbs standard to justify VRA renewal.
For example, controversies about voting in Florida, both in the 2000 election and in the run-up to the
2004 elections, might convince the Court of the need for VRA renewal. See, e.g., Ford Fessended,
Florida List for Purge of Voters is Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2004, at A 12.
274. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2009-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under that narrower understanding,
Congress could create causes of action against state actors, impose reporting requirements on states
that would facilitate enforcement, and perhaps impose other requirements short of regulating
primary conduct.
275. See id. at 2010-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. See id. at 2011 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (setting forth this test for Section 5
legislation).
278. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that, in his view, the FMLA was inappropriate Section 5 legislation because
Congress had made the statute applicable to all fifty states without documenting relevant
constitutional violations in each of them).
private parties, 279  and could not "violate other provisions of the
Constitution.,
280
Assuming Justice Scalia would apply his version of the Katzenbach v.
Morgan test to legislation aimed at enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment,28'
would VRA renewal get his vote? Certainly, one question would be whether
the VRA reflected "an identified history of relevant constitutional
violations" in the particular states on which the VRA would be made to
apply.282 The provisions of VRA set to expire in 2007, which are the ban on
literacy and other voter qualification tests283  and the pre-clearance
requirements for states' electoral procedure changes,2g, are limited to states
that combined literacy, good character or analogous qualification
requirements for voting with low registration or voting rates. 8 Should the
2007 renewal simply extend the terms of the current provisions - that is,
should the renewal be similarly geographically limited? Justice Scalia might
see a strong case for VRA renewal under his version of the deferential
Morgan standard. Indeed, it is quite possible that Justice Scalia crafted his
statement carefully, adopting the phrase "an identified history of...
violations" exactly because it would allow him to vote for VRA renewal
based on the history of voting rights violations in the covered
jurisdictions.286
Still, if the renewed VRA's geographic limitations are based on the
grandfathering in of states that were covered in 1965, 1970, and 1975,287
279. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1012 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. See id. at 2012-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. While the issue is not entirely clear, the logic of Justice Scalia's Lane dissent suggests that he
would apply his more lenient, McColloch-based formula for congressional power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Scalia cited South Carolina v. Katzenbach when arguing, in favor of
his stare decisis argument, that more generous understandings of the Section 5 power had, until
Hibbs, been limited to cases dealing with federal remedies for racial discrimination. See Lane, 124
S. Ct. at 2010 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It may also be significant that Justice Scalia described the
Voting Rights Act as "important and well-accepted." Id. His concentration on the original focus of
the Fourteenth Amendment on race, as a justification for his singling out of race remedies for more
generous treatment, would seem to apply as well to the Fifteenth Amendment, which by its terms is
limited to racial discrimination in the discrete area of voting. Similarly, his explanation that
nineteenth century cases' more generous standard arose during a time when Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees were far less broadly scoped than today surely applies as well to the Fifteenth
Amendment, given the narrow scope dictated by its terms. Thus, Justice Scalia's own analysis, as
well as the implications of that analysis, would suggest that he would apply the more generous
McCollochlMorgan standard to Section 2 legislation.
282. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000); see also id. at § 1973b(c) (defining these qualification
tests).
284. See id. at § 1973c.
285. See id. at § 1973c; id. at § 1973b(a)(1); id. at § 1973b(b) (setting forth the actual criteria for
inclusion in the qualification and pre-clearance provisions).
286. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. The 1970 and 1975 amendments to the VRA brought within the statute's qualification and
pre-clearance provisions states that were previously subject to those provisions, as well as those that
"satisfied" the qualification and low registration/turnout requirements for the first time. See Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314, 315; Act of Aug. 6, 1975,
[Vol. 32: 39, 2004] The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. Lane
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
then it is at least possible that Justice Scalia would find such old coverage
decisions insufficiently probative, especially given the countervailing
importance he would accord to insulating states from federal commands. In
such a case Justice Scalia, like the rest of the Court, would be forced to
consider whether the renewing Congress had compiled a sufficiently
probative record of state violations to justify renewal. It bears repeating that
in such a case Justice Scalia would require that a record be built pertaining
to each particular state Congress wished to regulate.288
B. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), a bill that would
prohibit most employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, has
been introduced in Congress nearly every session since the mid 1990,s.289
ENDA is undoubtedly constitutional as applied to private employers under
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, even after the recent
trimming of that power.29 ° Current doctrine would also allow ENDA to be
applied to state governments in their capacity as employers. 29t However, the
commerce power would not authorize Congress to make retrospective relief
available to state government employees as plaintiffs.29 2 Such relief could
be authorized only pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.29 3
Would ENDA pass muster as appropriate Section 5 legislation?
Certainly, prospects for that result have brightened since Hibbs and Lane.294
At the very least, those cases stand for some loosening of the stringent
Pub. L. No. 94-73 89 Stat. 400, 401. In essence, the VRA amendments left undisturbed previous
determinations that a state was subject to the VRA's qualification and pre-clearance provisions.
288. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. An issue for all members of the Court would be
whether the VRA itself is an unconstitutional race classification, and thus beyond Congress' power
to enact regardless of the outcome of the Section 5 analysis itself. Because this issue presents a
question of substantive constitutionality rather than congressional enforcement power, it is beyond
the scope of this Article. For an argument that recent interpretations of the VRA reduce the
likelihood that it will be found substantively unconstitutional, see Hasen, supra note 267.
289. See, e.g., H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1863, 104th
Cong. (1995); H.R. 4636, 103rd Cong. (1994); see also ENDA, supra note 6, at 6 n.37.
290. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). In particular, Morrison emphasized the importance of the economic or non-economic nature
of the activity when determining whether Congress could reach it under its commerce power. See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11. Because employment is a quintessential economic activity, there is
no reason to doubt that ENDA would fall within Morrison's understanding of the commerce power.
291. See Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
292. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
293. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Section 5 authorizes
Congress to make states liable for such relief).
294. See generally ENDA, supra note 6 (discussing ENDA's prospects as Section 5 legislation
before Hibbs and Lane).
review the Court had previously applied to Section 5 legislation. In
particular, they represent a loosening of Garrett's quite strict evidentiary
requirement. Nevertheless, both Hibbs and, to a lesser degree, Lane can be
read as narrow opinions. Both of them stress the important nature of the
value protected by Congress. In Hibbs, the Court explicitly concluded that
the increased judicial scrutiny accorded gender classifications made it easier
for Congress to identify the constitutional violations requisite to an
appropriate use of its Section 5 power.295 Similarly, in Lane the Court noted
the importance of the right to access to the judicial system.296 The Lane
Court used the importance of the underlying right somewhat differently than
in Hibbs, concluding that Title II's requirement of reasonable access closely
tracked the constitutional rule that cost or convenience was an insufficient
justification for denial of access. 297  Thus, the judicially-recognized
importance of the right meant that Congress made the Section 5 standard
easier to satisfy.
This analysis might find a more difficult application to ENDA. Because
sexual orientation is not a suspect class as gender is, and because
employment is not a fundamental right as the Court in Lane treated judicial
access, the more generous analysis in those cases does not immediately and
obviously apply to ENDA. Still, the constitutional status of sexual
orientation classifications remains in a state of flux. In Romer v. Evans,a95
the Court struck down such a classification on equal protection grounds,
while in Lawrence v. Texas,2 99 it struck down a ban on same-sex sodomy
using due process reasoning that included a significant equality theme.3°°
This protection for gays and lesbians, and for the conduct that largely
marks their status,01 might eventually be thought of as weighty enough to
justify the kinds of conclusions about ENDA that the Court drew about the
FMLA °2 and Title 11. 303 Most straightforwardly, if Romer eventually comes
to be seen as introducing some heightened level of scrutiny for sexual
orientation classifications, then Congress might be given an easier task in
identifying constitutional violations by states, thus justifying use of its
Section 5 power. Romer does not lend itself naturally to this sort of
evolution; in particular, its focus on the broad nature of the Amendment 2's
burden and its unusual effect in making gays and lesbians legal outcasts
295. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
296. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988-94.
297. See id. at 1992-94.
298. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
299. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
300. Id. at 2482 ("Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on
the latter point advances both interests.").
301. See infra notes 304-08.
302. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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means that it will take some effort to expand its logic into a general
presumption against sexual orientation classifications.
Lawrence will also require some expansion before it might become a
doctrinal anchor for a more deferential approach to ENDA. In particular, for
Lawrence to play this role it will be necessary for the Court to reason that
the intimacy right vindicated by Lawrence is threatened by explicit sexual
orientation classifications in fields such as employment. 304 The connection
between intimate conduct and group status is by no means impossible to
draw, just as it is not impossible to draw a more general connection between
liberty and equality. °5 Indeed, after Bowers v. Hardwick a tug of war
erupted between courts and gay rights advocates over whether the
constitutionality of same-sex sodomy prohibitions30 6 precluded heightened
judicial scrutiny of sexual orientation classifications. Courts, however, have
usually ruled that such heightened scrutiny was inappropriate, since the
Constitution allowed prohibition of the conduct that, in their view, defined
the class.
30 7
The Court in Lawrence also began to draw this connection between
liberty and equality - this time, to the benefit of gays and lesbians - when it
noted the status impact Texas' sodomy law had on gays and lesbians. 308
Still, given the complexity of that relationship, its fleshing out and
application to legal doctrine may require effort and a conscious expansion of
the Court's protection for both gay and lesbian intimate associations and
their status.
Beyond these difficult questions, Lane is notable also for its more
relaxed evidentiary standards independent of the importance of the
constitutional value at stake. As discussed earlier in this Article, the Lane
majority found support for Title II in instances of discrimination across a
spectrum of government activities beyond judicial administration,' °9 did not
require that all the evidence be explicitly spread across the legislative
record,310 and suggested that even private action might be probative in
demonstrating the need for Section 5 legislation.3 1  This more relaxed
304. This same analysis could, of course, apply to the evolution of the Court's own approach to
sexual orientation discrimination.
305. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 981 (1979).
306. While the Georgia statute at issue did not distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex
sodomy, the Hardwick Court presented the issue as one dealing with same-sex sodomy. See
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-191.
307. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also ENDA, supra. note 6, at 31-34.
308. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
309. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989-90.
310. See id. at 1991-92.
311. See id. at 1991 n.16.
evidentiary requirement certainly cannot harm the prospects for a future
ENDA passing Section 5 muster.
Nevertheless, the congruence and proportionality test still requires that
this more relaxed evidentiary requirement be applied against the standard of
a judicially derived rule regarding the importance of the underlying
constitutional value; in this case either the suspectness of sexual orientation
classifications generally, or the importance of the substantive right to
government employment, or the right to intimacy.31 2 As noted above, Hibbs
and Lane read their respective statutes as focusing on values that received
greater-than-normal judicial protection.1 3 That judicial determination of the
importance of the underlying right played an integral part in those opinions.
Unless that juricentric model is altered, or the courts expand Romer and
Lawrence into more general protections for gays and lesbians, or Congress
creates a powerful evidentiary case about the irrationality of sexual
orientation-based employment discrimination 31 4 or the linkage between that
discrimination and the right to intimacy, then the fate of ENDA as Section 5
legislation remains unclear even after Hibbs and Lane.
V. CONCLUSION: THE TWO FACES OF LANE
Lane represents an important, yet an incremental, step toward a more
expansive Section 5 power. The obvious need to retain Justice O'Connor's
vote no doubt prevented Justice Stevens from writing a majority opinion that
would have echoed more explicitly Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrett.31 5
Justice Breyer's dissent, in a case dealing with Title I of the ADA's
prohibitions on disability-related employment discrimination, credited
instances of discrimination not dealing with employment particularly, as
well as discrimination performed by non-state actors,316 allowed Congress to
draw from that evidence more general conclusions than a court might be
justified in doing when determining a particular party's guilt or innocence.3 17
312. See supra note 3044 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992. The majority stated:
We explained [in Hibbs) that because the FMLA was targeted at sex-based
classifications, which are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, "it was
easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations" than in Garrett or
Kimel, both of which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to
rational-basis review. Title II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights,
including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that call for a standard of
judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more searching, than the standard
that applies to sex-based classifications.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
314. See ENDA, supra note 6, at 50-58 (suggesting avenues for congressional fact finding).
315. Except for Justice O'Connor, all of the members of the Lane majority joined in Justice
Breyer's dissent in Garrett. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
316. See id. at 377-79.
317. See id. at 380 (allowing Congress to "draw general conclusions.. .from anecdotal and
opinion-based evidence..."); id. at 382-84 (arguing that Congress should be free of the evidentiary
rules and presumptions reflecting courts' institutional limitations).
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Justice Breyer noted the institutional differences between courts and
Congress that suggested the latter's competence to impose greater burdens
on states than courts could when adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment
claims.
3 18
Justice Stevens' opinion in Lane makes tentative moves in the direction
of Justice Breyer's Garrett dissent. By taking into account evidence that
does not directly relate to discrimination with regard to judicial access, and
evidence from non-state actors,319 it suggests the same sort of broader
understanding of how discrimination in one area or by one type of actor in
society suggests the possibility of discrimination in or by another.32 °
Similarly, by taking into account evidence from a task force, 321 Lane echoes
Justice Breyer's argument that Congress' representative nature allows it to
garner evidence from broader sources than a court.322 Lane's explicit
statement about Congress' power to enact disparate impact legislation in
areas beyond race 323 echoes Justice Breyer's statement to that effect.
32 4
Finally, Lane's congruence and proportionality analysis, which focused on
the degree to which the challenged statute tracked the constitutional rule,
rather than on the degree to which the statute directly targeted actual
adjudicated or otherwise proven constitutional violations,32 finds a close
analogue in Justice Breyer's analysis of how Title I, properly understood
against Congress' institutional capacities to discern unfair discrimination,
tracked the Court's constitutional rule against irrational disability-based
discrimination.326
Still, these statements in Lane are either dicta 327 or are applied less
aggressively than in Justice Breyer's Garrett dissent.3 2 8  The result is an
318. See id. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress' nature as an elected body
gives it more authority than a court to second-guess state legislative determinations).
319. See, e.g., Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1981.
320. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
321. SeeLane, 124 S. Ct. at 1981.
322. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
323. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986.
324. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993-94.
326. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327. See, e.g., Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991-92 n.16-17 (explaining that Hibbs' analysis was based
largely on evidence of private actor conduct).
328. For example, Justice Breyer's opinion explicitly discusses the institutional competence
differences that he believes justifies Congress in taking a much broader approach to the evidence.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, for justification supporting
congressional authority to go farther than a court could to override states' decisions to classify on the
basis of disability. See id. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's explicitness is largely
absent from Lane, which discussed the evidence much more straightforwardly. For the presentation
of a convincing case for Title H without any need to account for Congress' institutional capabilities,
see Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 (referring to "the sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature
opinion that straddles the two opinions in Garrett, ostensibly following the
majority's analysis but applying it in a way hearkening to the dissent's. It
may well be that Lane's "strict in theory but somewhat more lenient in
fact ' 329 review of Section 5 legislation may be the most change the Garrett
dissenters will be able to achieve with the current membership of the Court.
If so, then Lane is perhaps best understood as an opinion that paused the
current Court's insistence on strict review of Section 5 legislation. Whether
that pause is temporary or the precursor to a change in direction is a question
that will have to await changes in the Court's composition.
and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of
public services"). The court concluded that Title II was congruent and proportional because it
tracked the constitutional rule so closely. Id. at 1994 ("[Title H's] duty to accommodate is perfectly
consistent with the well-established principle that, 'within the limits of practicability, a State must
afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard' in its courts") (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
329. The reference, of course, is to Gerald Gunther's description of strict scrutiny. See generally
Symposium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez: Panel HI, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
695, 723-724 (1996). Perhaps more deeply, though, it also refers to, not coincidentally, Justice
O'Connor's insistence that strict scrutiny is not in fact fatal. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
326-27 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 112-13 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was the fifth vote in Lane,
joining the four dissenters in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett. See supra note 261 and
accompanying text.
